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  INTRODUCTION   
Copyright’s origin story, rooted in the Constitution,1 ap-
pears to be a simple and elegant matter of economics. Granting 
authors exclusive rights in their works of authorship protects 
them from literary piracy and allows them to extract value 
from their mental labors. This legal protection, in turn, moti-
vates authors to produce the kind of creative and informative 
works that make the world a more interesting and enlightened 
place.2 James Madison neatly summed up this happy tale of 
symbiosis by noting that with copyright, “[t]he public good fully 
coincides . . . with the claims of individuals.”3 There’s only one 
problem with this appealing story: it’s not true. The past dec-
ade has seen a flood of legal scholarship devoted to undermin-
ing the foundations of copyright’s central incentivist narrative. 
This work has challenged the assumption that money plays 
much of a role at all in motivating artistic production, suggest-
ing instead that the desire for subcultural status or the intrin-
sic enjoyment of the creative process are stronger drivers of 
creative production.4 Other research has shown that factors 
foreign to U.S. law, like the desire for attribution, play a persis-
tent role in authors’ incentives.5 And evidence from a broad ar-
ray of social science fields has suggested that monetary incen-
tives do little to improve, and may actually worsen, creative 
 
 1. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
 2. Countless sources echo this origin story. For just one, see CRAIG 
JOYCE ET AL., COPYRIGHT LAW 54–56 (9th ed. 2013). 
 3. THE FEDERALIST NO. 43 (James Madison). 
 4. See Rebecca Tushnet, Economies of Desire: Fair Use and Marketplace 
Assumptions, 51 WM. & MARY L. REV. 513, 522–36 (2009). 
 5. See Jeanne C. Fromer, Expressive Incentives in Intellectual Property, 
98 VA. L. REV. 1745, 1759–89 (2012). 
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production, suggesting that copyright law’s origin story has it 
exactly backward.6  
These and many other critiques do an admirable job of 
showing the flaws in copyright law’s basic assumptions about 
what leads people to create, but the motivation to create 
amounts to only one half of this narrative. Exclusive rights are 
not only a carrot meant to tempt authors into creating new 
works, but also a stick that allows authors to protect their 
works with credible threats of litigation. In copyright’s stand-
ard story, owners would sue for infringement only when neces-
sary to preserve the income stream that flows from their works, 
causing infringement litigation to work in concert with copy-
right’s idealized incentivist structure.7 But anecdotal evidence 
indicates that owners of literary property frequently perceive 
themselves to be wronged for reasons unrelated to financial 
harm. Instead, their objections to unauthorized use invoke a 
variety of non-pecuniary considerations. For example, Dilbert 
creator Scott Adams conceded that although the unauthorized 
use of his comic strips probably helped promote his brand and 
enhance his viewership, he still regarded it as wrong and as a 
profoundly personal violation.8 Fashion houses typically ex-
press outrage at the perceived wrongfulness of having their 
work copied,9 despite a growing body of evidence that knock-off 
designs actually provide an economic benefit, rather than a 
detriment, to designers.10 And when the devout Christian sculp-
tor Frederick Hart sued Warner Brothers for using a likeness 
of his religious sculpture in the orgy scene of the film The Dev-
il’s Advocate, he explained his motivation not in terms of the 
studio’s failure to pay for the rights to use his work, but be-
 
 6. See Eric E. Johnson, Intellectual Property and the Incentive Fallacy, 
39 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 623, 640–47 (2012). 
 7. See William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, An Economic Analysis of 
Copyright Law, 18 J. LEGAL STUD. 325 (1989). 
 8. Scott Adams, Is Copyright Violation Stealing?, DILBERT BLOG (Apr. 7, 
2007), http://dilbertblog.typepad.com/the_dilbert_blog/2007/04/is_copyright_vi 
.html. 
 9. See generally KAL RAUSTIALA & CHRISTOPHER SPRIGMAN, THE 
KNOCKOFF ECONOMY: HOW IMITATION SPARKS INNOVATION (2012) (recounting 
stories of fashion designers, such as Foley + Corinna, whose anger over unau-
thorized copies of their clothing led them to lobby for federal legislation to stop 
the practice). 
 10. Kal Raustiala & Christopher Sprigman, The Piracy Paradox: Innova-
tion and Intellectual Property in Fashion Design, 92 VA. L. REV. 1687, 1732–35 
(2006) (arguing that unauthorized copies of fashion designs help the copied 
designers by burnishing their brands while not harming them because 
knockoffs are purchased by consumers in different markets). 
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cause he felt deeply offended at the inclusion of his Christian-
themed sculpture in a prurient context.11  
Just as copyright’s ex ante incentives story does not mesh 
with authors’ actual motivations to create, copyright’s ex post 
infringement story does not mesh with owners’ actual motiva-
tions to file suit. Yet while the secondary literature is replete 
with accounts exploring the former issue, it is mostly silent as 
to the latter.12 In this Article, we seek to remedy this lacuna in 
copyright scholarship, critiquing the dominant economic ac-
count of infringement litigation by exposing the complex psy-
chological causes that lead owners to sue over unauthorized use 
of their works. This account is important for two related rea-
sons. First, it provides the missing counterpart to the critique 
of copyright’s authorial incentive story. Scholars have focused 
these critiques on the mismatch between economic incentives 
and future creative production. Our analysis of the psychology 
of infringement litigation shows that copyright’s market-
oriented approach is flawed for a separate, unappreciated rea-
son: owners’ ex post reasons for suing are also at odds with the 
kind of predominantly monetary motivations that copyright law 
is meant to assume. And second, exposing the complex moral 
psychology of infringement reveals that owners are often moti-
vated to litigate in ways that undermine, rather than further, 
copyright’s goals of optimizing creative production. This insight 
carries important normative implications, for it is only when 
law takes account of the full range of owners’ motivations for 
filing suit—financial and nonfinancial alike—that it can craft a 
copyright regime that effectively promotes creative and intel-
lectual progress. 
The many critiques of copyright’s economic-incentivist 
model typically debunk that model by looking to the psychology 
of creation and creativity.13 Here, too, we critique the infringe-
ment aspect of this model by looking to the psychology of trans-
 
 11. Gustav Niebuhr, Warner Brothers Sued Over Use of Sculpture in “Dev-
il’s Advocate,” DESERET NEWS (Dec. 7, 1997), http://www.deseretnews.com/ 
article/599449/Warner-Brothers-sued-over-use-of-sculpture-in-Devils-Advocate 
.html. 
 12. There is some interesting work about other aspects of infringement 
litigation, such as what drives lay perceptions of substantial similarity. See 
Shyamkrishna Balganesh et al., Judging Similarity, 100 IOWA L. REV. 267 
(2014).  
 13. See generally, e.g., Julie E. Cohen, Creativity and Culture in Copyright 
Theory, 40 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1151 (2007); Jeanne C. Fromer, A Psychology of 
Intellectual Property, 104 NW. U. L. REV. 1441 (2010). 
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gression. Our analysis seeks to locate the foundational motiva-
tions that lead owners to feel wronged by unauthorized users. 
To that end, we deploy recent research in moral psychology, a 
field that examines why people perceive certain conduct as 
right or wrong. A particular school of thought within moral 
psychology, moral foundations theory (MFT), provides a sys-
tematic framework for understanding and explaining the psy-
chology of infringement.14 This theory illuminates the plural, 
innate reactions that inevitably characterize owners’ reactions 
to copyright infringement—and that range far beyond concern 
for financial gain or loss. The moralized anger or hurt that peo-
ple express in reaction to unauthorized use of their creative 
works have their roots in intuitive concerns about issues such 
as non-pecuniary harm, broken reciprocity, anti-Americanism, 
threats to social order, and a sense of disgust and sacrilege.15  
This Article presents a novel view of the complex moral 
psychology of infringement. It does so both to complement ex-
tant critiques of copyright’s incentivist story and to provide a 
realistic account of owners’ motivations for infringement on 
which a more effective copyright regime may be built. We elab-
orate these claims as follows. Part I highlights the contrast be-
tween the robust critiques of copyright’s theory of creation and 
the paucity of attention to its theory of litigation, and illus-
trates the social costs produced by increasingly common in-
fringement suits animated by nonfinancial concerns. Part II 
develops a psychology of infringement, rooted in MFT, that il-
luminates the plural motivations—including, but ranging far 
beyond, pecuniary harm—that underlie owners’ decisions to 
sue (or threats to do so). Part III elaborates the implications of 
our analysis. We first show how our claims forge a middle path 
that mediates between the traditionally opposed copyright par-
adigms of market-focused utilitarianism and moral rights. Se-
cond, we identify a series of policy levers that lawmakers could 
employ to reform copyright law in a way that is both mindful of 
the realities of owners’ moral psychology and still true to copy-
right’s goals of optimizing creative production. Finally, the 
Conclusion reflects on possibilities for future work framed by 
 
 14. For a summary of MFT’s claims and the empirical evidence supporting 
it, see Jesse Graham et al., Mapping the Moral Domain, 101 J. PERSONALITY 
& SOC. PSYCHOL. 366 (2011). 
 15. See Jesse Graham et al., Moral Foundations Theory: The Pragmatic 
Validity of Moral Pluralism, in 47 ADVANCES IN EXPERIMENTAL SOCIAL PSY-
CHOLOGY 55, 61–71 (Patricia Devine & Ashby Plant eds., 2013) (discussing the 
various moral foundations that animate our notions of right and wrong). 
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our analysis, such as empirical research that would further 
shed light on copyright owners’ subjective experience of in-
fringement. 
I.  COPYRIGHT CONSEQUENTIALISM AND HUMAN 
BEHAVIOR   
Courts and scholars generally agree that U.S. copyright 
law is and should be based on consequentialist principles of op-
timizing creative production by granting certain rights to au-
thors of original works. These rights help protect authors’ in-
centives to create works, and their infringement can result in 
steep monetary damages and injunctive relief. On this view, 
copyright law is about regulating markets for creativity.16 Ac-
cordingly, other considerations, including so-called “moral” 
rights, have no place.  
Copyright law’s market-oriented consequentialism, howev-
er, presents an impoverished view of authors’ true motivations 
with respect both to creating new works and to protecting them 
via infringement lawsuits. The reasons that authors create and 
the reasons that they object to uses of their works extend far 
beyond pecuniary considerations. Much work has noted that 
copyright fails to account for the full range of authors’ creative 
incentives, but none has yet systematically explored the correl-
ative point that copyright’s theory of why owners sue (or 
threaten to sue) over unauthorized use is similarly narrow and 
flawed. In this Part, we begin to fill in this gap in the litera-
ture, explaining copyright’s market-based consequentialism 
and how this leads law to craft a one-note economic vision of 
why owners object to unauthorized use of their works. 
A. INCENTIVES AND INFRINGEMENT 
1. The Economics of Copyright Law 
Creative works like songs, movies, and books present a 
tricky economic problem—they are incredibly costly to make, 
but once they have been made they can be very cheaply copied 
and distributed. In order to recoup the costs of producing new 
works, authors may try to price copies of their works above the 
 
 16. WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUC-
TURE OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW 4 (2003) (“Today it is acknowledged 
that analysis and evaluation of intellectual property law are appropriately 
conducted within an economic framework that seeks to align that law with the 
dictates of economic efficiency.”). 
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marginal cost of producing each copy. But others, who have not 
invested in creating the works, can simply copy them and sell 
them for less. Eventually, if markets are efficient, the cost of a 
copy of the work will be driven down to the marginal cost of 
producing and distributing it. At this point, however, authors 
are unable to recoup the costs of their creative investments 
and, instead of creating new works, may choose to do some-
thing else with their lives; there is no incentive to continue 
singing, filming, and writing.17 
Copyright law solves this public goods problem by giving 
authors exclusive rights to copy, distribute, perform, display, 
and remake their works.18 These rights allow authors to charge 
prices for copies that exceed the marginal costs of production, 
thereby allowing them an opportunity to recoup their initial in-
vestments.19 Moreover, if others violate these rights, authors 
can sue to enjoin further infringement20 and to recover substan-
tial damage awards representing the profits they have lost or 
disgorging the profits the infringers have gained.21 The law 
prevents others from producing works or copies that risk sub-
stituting for the original author’s work.22 Copyright law pre-
serves authors’ ability to make money from their creations and, 
thus, the public is better off because people can now hear, see, 
and read these new works. 
 
 17. For a review of this approach, see id. at 37–70. 
 18. 17 U.S.C. § 106 (2012).  
 19. Of course, not all authors will recoup their investments if the public 
decides it does not want to consume the work at any price. See WINTER’S TALE, 
(Warner Bros. Ent. 2014); John Clyde, 5 Biggest Box Office Flops of 2014, So 
Far, KSL.COM (May 5, 2014, 2:04 PM), http://www.ksl.com/?sid=29768532& 
nid=1205&title=5biggestboxofficeflopsof2014sofar (explaining that Winter’s 
Tale cost $60 million to make yet produced worldwide gross earnings of merely 
$27 million). And by “see” in the citation, we do not, in fact, suggest that you 
see Winter’s Tale. 
 20. 17 U.S.C. § 502(a) (“Any court having jurisdiction of a civil action aris-
ing under this title may, subject to the provisions of section 1498 of title 28, 
grant temporary and final injunctions on such terms as it may deem reasona-
ble to prevent or restrain infringement of a copyright.”). 
 21. Id. § 504(a) (“Except as otherwise provided by this title, an infringer of 
copyright is liable for either—(1) the copyright owner’s actual damages and 
any additional profits of the infringer, . . . or (2) statutory damages . . . .”). 
 22. Shyamkrishna Balganesh, The Obligatory Structure of Copyright Law: 
Unbundling the Wrong of Copying, 125 HARV. L. REV. 1664, 1679 (2012) (“By 
deterring such copying, copyright law in turn preserves creators’ incentives to 
produce more creative expression. The law treats copying as a wrong in this 
view only because of the law’s commitment to inducing creativity by deterring 
copying.”). 
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In solving this problem, however, copyright law creates 
other problems. First, because authors can charge supra-
marginal prices for copies of their works, some people will not 
get to enjoy them.23 A consumer might have been willing to pay 
the marginal cost of producing and distributing copies of a mov-
ie, but she might not be willing to pay the supra-marginal rate 
charged by the author. This missed opportunity, known as a 
deadweight loss, is one of the costs of the copyright system.24 
Second, because copyright law gives authors the exclusive 
rights to remake and adapt their works, it increases the costs of 
secondary creativity.25 If a new creator has an idea for how to 
improve or adapt a protected work, she must first engage in 
costly negotiations with the original author.26 The costs of nego-
tiating and the original author’s ability to unilaterally prevent 
many adaptations of her work mean that some new works will 
never get created.27 The limitations on subsequent creators are 
another cost of the copyright system.  
For these reasons, copyright law does not assign authors 
the most robust set of rights possible; instead, it works a 
tradeoff between the incentives given to authors and access to 
creative works preserved for the public.28 Copyrighted works 
eventually enter the public domain, at which point they can be 
freely copied, used, and adapted by others.29 Moreover, not all 
uses of a work constitute copyright infringement,30 and other 
 
 23. LANDES & POSNER, supra note 16, at 22 (“[IP] rights reduce the de-
mand for intellectual property by inserting a wedge between price and mar-
ginal cost, creating deadweight loss that must be balanced against the disin-
centive effects of denying the creator of such property a remedy against 
copiers.”).  
 24. Id. 
 25. Id. at 58 (“By discouraging copying, [copyright law] discourages the 
historically very important form of artistic creativity that consists of taking 
existing work and improving it.”). 
 26. Id. at 60. 
 27. See Christopher Buccafusco & Christopher Jon Sprigman, The Crea-
tivity Effect, 78 U. CHI. L. REV. 31, 46 (2011). 
 28. Sony Corp. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 432 (1984) 
(“Copyright protection . . . has never accorded the copyright owner complete 
control over all possible uses of his work.”). 
 29. For newly created works, copyright subsists for the life of the author 
plus seventy years or for ninety-five years from the date of publication, de-
pending on the type of work. 17 U.S.C. § 302 (2012); see Jessica Litman, The 
Public Domain, 39 EMORY L.J. 965 (1990) (introducing the notion of the public 
domain as an object of social and cultural concern). 
 30. See, e.g., Vincent v. City Colls. Of Chi., 485 F.3d 919, 923 (7th Cir. 
2007) (“[Plaintiff] appears to believe that a copyright entitles the author to de-
termine how a work is used and thus to prevent the book’s adoption as a 
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uses of a work are exempted from the authors’ exclusive rights 
under the fair use doctrine.31 This doctrine ensures that some 
valuable uses of a work, including for criticism, parody, or edu-
cational purposes, are not solely under the author’s control. 
Through these and other doctrines, copyright law attempts to 
balance creative incentives and public access.32 Rights are 
granted solely for the purpose of incentivizing creative produc-
tion,33 but, given the costs these rights generate, they must be 
limited to that purpose only. As a matter of economic theory, 
any copyright protection that exceeds the minimum necessary 
to encourage creativity is costly to social welfare.  
The rules related to infringement litigation—the focus of 
this Article—are meant to exemplify this balance between 
market-based incentives and public access. The rights granted 
by copyright law seek primarily to prevent unauthorized copy-
ing that substitutes for the market of the author’s work.34 When 
there is no reason to think that the defendant’s copy will sub-
stitute for the author’s work, there is no threat to the author’s 
creative incentives, and thus, no need for copyright protection. 
Copyright law’s focus on monetary creative incentives is most 
evident in its remedial doctrines. The law’s damages provisions 
entitle plaintiffs to relief for financial losses that have been 
caused by the infringement, but plaintiffs are not allowed to re-
cover for non-pecuniary losses, including emotional harm.35 
Successful plaintiffs may recover for both their actual damages 
and any profits made by defendants that are attributable to the 
 
teaching text. Not at all.”). 
 31. 17 U.S.C. § 107. 
 32. LANDES & POSNER, supra note 16, at 11. 
 33. When we refer to “creative production,” this includes behaviors associ-
ated with producing the work as well as those associated with distributing it. 
See Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 188 (2003) (noting that copyright protec-
tion might be granted to “encourage copyright holders to invest in the restora-
tion and public distribution of their works”). 
 34. Judge Posner explains copyright’s focus on substitutionary copying in 
Ty, Inc. v. Publications International Ltd., 292 F.3d 512, 517 (7th Cir. 2002) 
(“[C]opying that is complementary to the copyrighted work (in the sense that 
nails are complements of hammers) is fair use, but copying that is a substi-
tute for the copyrighted work (in the sense that nails are substitutes for pegs 
or screws), or for derivative works from the copyrighted work . . . is not fair 
use.”). 
 35. 17 U.S.C. § 504(b). The limitation of damages to financial losses, un-
fair gains, and statutory damages appears to apply to violations of the Visual 
Artists Rights Act, 17 U.S.C. § 106A, as well. See 5 WILLIAM F. PATRY, PATRY 
ON COPYRIGHT § 16:46, at 16-92 (2015). 
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infringement.36 These amounts reflect the value of sales of the 
work by plaintiffs or defendants.37 Alternatively, plaintiffs may 
elect to recover “statutory damages” instead of proving actual 
damages.38 Nonetheless, statutory damages are still generally 
intended to serve as a means of protecting the markets of copy-
righted works because actual damages are hard to measure and 
infringement is difficult to deter;39 they are not meant to allow 
recovery of non-pecuniary losses.40 Similarly, injunctive relief 
made available by copyright law is intended to prevent irrepa-
rable monetary harm caused by the possibility of further in-
fringement.41 
This focus on pecuniary incentives is also explicit in the 
fair use analysis. Each of the four statutory fair use factors ex-
plores, to varying degrees, the extent to which the defendant’s 
conduct poses a risk to the author’s incentives.42 The first fac-
 
 36. Pfanenstiel Architects, Inc. v. Chouteau Petroleum Co., 978 F.2d 430, 
432 (8th Cir. 1992) (“The Copyright Act allows recovery of actual damages, in 
addition to the infringer’s profits, in recognition that some types of infringe-
ment inflict more harm to the copyright owner than the benefit reaped by the 
infringer, for example, where the infringer’s minimal use forecloses a broader 
market or where the copyright owner’s provable profit margin is greater than 
the infringer’s.” (citations omitted)); see also Eagle Servs. Corp. v. H20 Indus. 
Servs., Inc., 532 F.3d 620, 624 (7th Cir. 2008). 
 37. 4 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT, 
§ 14.02[A][1], at 14-14 to -17 (2015). 
 38. 17 U.S.C. § 504I(1). 
 39. H. COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 87TH CONG., COPYRIGHT LAW REVISION: 
REPORT OF THE REGISTER OF COPYRIGHTS ON THE GENERAL REVISION OF THE 
U.S. COPYRIGHT LAW 102–03 (Comm. Print 1961) (listing four reasons for 
statutory damages); see also Christopher Buccafusco & Jonathan S. Masur, 
Innovation and Incarceration: An Economic Analysis of Criminal Intellectual 
Property Law, 87 S. CAL. L. REV. 275, 304–05 (2014) (discussing the role of 
statutory damages as a multiplier that compensates for under-enforcement of 
IP rights). 
 40. See 6 PATRY, supra note 35, § 22:174, at 22-451. This is not to suggest 
that statutory damages and injunctive relief were exclusively meant to solve 
economic problems in copyright law. These two doctrines can also be under-
stood as protecting authors’ moral interests in their works above and beyond 
any dollar losses that they may suffer. 
 41. 17 U.S.C. § 502(a) (“Any court having jurisdiction of a civil action aris-
ing under this title may, subject to the provisions of section 1498 of title 28, 
grant temporary and final injunctions on such terms as it may deem reasona-
ble to prevent or restrain infringement of a copyright.”); see 6 PATRY, supra 
note 35, § 22:74, at 22-233 to -237. 
 42. The four factors are: 
(1) the purpose and character of the use, including whether such use 
is of a commercial nature or is for nonprofit educational purposes; 
(2) the nature of the copyrighted work; 
(3) the amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation to 
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tor’s emphasis on the nature of the defendant’s use distin-
guishes between commercial activities that are likely to ad-
versely affect the market for the author’s work and non-
commercial activities that are less likely to do so. The first fac-
tor also differentiates “productive” or “transformative” uses of 
the author’s work from uses that will substitute for its market 
value.43 Even more explicitly, the fourth factor addresses “the 
effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of the 
copyrighted work.”44 The Supreme Court has called this factor 
“undoubtedly the single most important element of fair use.”45 
When the defendant’s work causes “harm arising from [its] 
ability . . . to act as a substitute for plaintiff’s work in the mar-
ketplace” it will weigh strongly against a finding of fair use.46 
The second and third factors, which address, respectively, the 
nature of the plaintiff’s work and the amount that was copied, 
also help determine whether the defendant’s behavior is a 
threat to market-based creative incentives.47 The fair use doc-
 
the copyrighted work as a whole; and 
(4) the effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of the 
copyrighted work. 
17 U.S.C. § 107. Although the fourth factor is explicitly concerned with market 
harm, each of the other factors reflects a concern with markets and incentives. 
See Wendy J. Gordon, Fair Use as Market Failure: A Structural and Economic 
Analysis of the Betamax Case and Its Predecessors, 82 COLUM. L. REV. 1600, 
1604–05 (1982). 
 43. Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 579 (1994); Pierre 
N. Leval, Toward a Fair Use Standard, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1105, 1111 (1990). 
In Campbell, for example, the Court stressed that fair use tolerates trans-
formative uses because they are less likely to be market substitutes for the 
owner’s work. 510 U.S. at 591 (“[W]hen . . . the second use is transformative, 
market substitution is at least less certain, and market harm may not be so 
readily inferred. Indeed, as to parody pure and simple, it is more likely that 
the new work will not affect the market for the original in a way cognizable 
under this factor, that is, by acting as a substitute for it.”). 
 44. 17 U.S.C. § 107. 
 45. Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 566 
(1985) (footnote omitted). Whether this is still the case has been doubted. See 4 
PATRY, supra note 35, § 10:149, at 10-503. 
 46. 4 PATRY, supra note 35, § 10:150, at 10-510. 
 47. The second factor’s analysis of the nature of the plaintiff’s work often 
involves attention to the reasons for its creation and its status as published or 
unpublished. See Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 553 (“The right of first publica-
tion implicates a threshold decision by the author whether and in what form to 
release his work.”); Brewer v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 749 F.2d 527, 529 (9th 
Cir. 1984) (distinguishing between informational and creative works). In con-
sidering the amount and substantiality of the portion used in the defendant’s 
work, the third factor assumes that smaller or less important uses are less 
likely to have substitutive effects on the plaintiff’s market. Harper & Row, 471 
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trine is meant to absolve users of copyrighted works of in-
fringement liability when their behavior is unlikely to harm 
authors’ financial motivations for creating and distributing new 
works. 
Under the standard view, copyright law exists to solve an 
economic problem about creative incentives and public access. 
Contemporary copyright’s infringement doctrines reflect this 
concern about optimizing market-based incentives. In particu-
lar, copyright law’s remedial and fair use doctrines stress the 
importance of market harm as the primary, and perhaps even 
sole, feature of the wrongfulness of unauthorized use. Where 
market harm, and thus harm to creative incentives, does not 
exist, copyright law should not curtail behavior.48 
2. Markets, Motives, and Morals 
The preceding subsection described copyright law’s basic 
normative consequentialist structure and the doctrines it em-
ploys to achieve it. That structure arises from foundational as-
sumptions about people’s behavior and motivation. The govern-
ing assumption of copyright law is that people are rational 
maximizers of their own welfare, measured primarily in mone-
tary terms.49 People act—to create new works, to copy or con-
sume those works, and to litigate over them—when the mone-
tary benefits they receive exceed the activity’s monetary costs.  
As Samuel Johnson said, “[n]o man but a blockhead ever 
wrote, except for money,”50 and U.S. copyright law generally 
concurs that financial incentives are essential for creativity. In 
1954, the Supreme Court explained, “[t]he economic philosophy 
 
U.S. at 565 (“[T]he fact that a substantial portion of the infringing work was 
copied verbatim is evidence of the qualitative value of the copied material, 
both to the originator and to the plagiarist who seeks to profit from marketing 
someone else’s copyrighted expression.”). 
 48. There are some instances where the Copyright Act does appear ani-
mated by concerns separate and apart from incentivizing authors to create. 
The Visual Artists Rights Act (VARA), 17 U.S.C. § 106A, provisions enabling 
terminations of transfer, id. § 203, and various exceptions in favor of the blind, 
id. § 121, seem motivated by moral rights or fairness considerations. As ex-
plained in Part I.A, though, the dominant theme in the Copyright Act appears 
to be its concern for optimizing creative production by extending economic mo-
nopolies to authors. And even if this were not the case, our claims in Part III 
would remain the same, since we regard this as a worthy normative aspira-
tion. 
 49. See Buccafusco & Sprigman, supra note 27, at 45. 
 50. Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 584 (1994) (quoting 
Samuel Johnson). 
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behind the clause empowering Congress to grant patents and 
copyrights is the conviction that encouragement of individual 
effort by personal gain is the best way to advance public wel-
fare through the talents of authors and inventors in ‘Science 
and useful Arts.’”51 More recently, the Court, riffing on Adam 
Smith, declared that “copyright law serves public ends by 
providing individuals with an incentive to pursue private 
ones.”52 Leading theories of copyright law also subscribe to the 
notion that financial incentives are the dominant motivators of 
authors’ behavior.53 People will not create new works nor sue to 
protect them, according to this theory, unless it makes econom-
ic sense to do so.54 
In the standard view of how infringement works, copyright 
law pairs a consequentialist, pecuniary, and market-oriented 
goal with a rationalist, pecuniary, and market-oriented account 
of human behavior. Copyright law is seen as an administrative 
system for regulating the behavior of rational, welfare-
maximizing people. Accordingly, “moral” concerns about fair-
ness, justice, and “rights” are generally considered irrelevant at 
best and harmful at worst to copyright law’s aims and doc-
trines. It is a familiar, even uncontroversial, notion among 
judges and scholars that American copyright law is not driven 
by so-called “moral”—i.e., non-pecuniary—considerations.55 Wil-
 
 51. Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 219 (1954). 
 52. Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 212 n.18; ADAM SMITH, AN INQUIRY 
INTO AND CAUSES OF THE WEALTH OF NATIONS 70 (Roy H. Campbell & Andrew 
S. Skinner eds., Liberty Fund 1981) (1776) (“It is not from the benevolence of 
the butcher, the brewer, or the baker, that we expect our dinner, but from 
their regard to their own interest. We address ourselves, not to their humanity 
but to their self-love, and never talk to them of our necessities but of their ad-
vantages.”). 
 53. According to Landes and Posner, “[s]ince the decision whether to cre-
ate the work must be made before the demand for copies is known, it will be a 
‘go’ only if the difference between expected revenue and the cost of making 
copies equals or exceeds the cost of expression.” LANDES & POSNER, supra note 
16, at 39; see also RONALD A. CASS & KEITH N. HILTON, LAWS OF CREATION: 
PROPERTY RIGHTS IN THE WORLD OF IDEAS (2013) (applying an economic 
framework to the analysis of intellectual property laws). 
 54. Julie Cohen explains, “[p]ractitioners of economic analysis treat crea-
tive motivation as both internal and exogenous—a preexisting preference that 
matters only to the extent that it is presumptively enhanced by the possibility 
of an economic reward.” JULIE E. COHEN, CONFIGURING THE NETWORKED 
SELF: LAW, CODE, AND THE PLAY OF EVERYDAY PRACTICE 65 (2012). 
 55. E.g., Cassandra Spangler, The Integrity Right of an MP3: How the In-
troduction of Moral Rights into U.S. Law Can Help Combat Illegal Peer-to-
Peer Music File Sharing, 39 SETON HALL L. REV. 1299, 1321 (2009) 
(“[C]opyright is inherently amoral.” (internal quotation marks omitted) (cita-
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liam Patry, for example, observed that “[t]here is no reason to 
keep pretending that the Copyright Wars involve morality or 
principle—they don’t and never have.”56 Judges echo this con-
sensus. In the earliest U.S. Supreme Court copyright case, 
Wheaton v. Peters, the Court held that copyright was solely a 
product of statutory law, not natural right. This holding explic-
itly rejected the plaintiff’s position that copyright was “estab-
lished in . . . abstract morality.”57 The Court has explained that 
“[t]he primary objective of copyright is not to reward the labor 
of authors, but to ‘promote the Progress of Science and the 
useful Arts.’”58 Federal courts have generally concurred in this 
conclusion, typically citing copyright’s market-based underpin-
nings as a basis for rejecting any other human motivations in 
the infringement calculus. As the Second Circuit recently held, 
“copyright laws are not matters of strong moral principle but 
rather represent economic legislation based on policy decisions 
that assign rights based on assessments of what legal rules will 
produce the greatest economic good for society as a whole.”59  
Some scholars object to the status quo account of U.S. cop-
yright law, including its infringement provisions, and have ar-
gued that the law should also reflect other, non-
consequentialist concerns such as authorial dignity and auton-
omy. Yet, even these authors acknowledge the dominantly eco-
nomic basis of domestic copyright law.60 Further, the instances 
 
tion omitted)); Patti Waldmeir, There Is No Nobility in Music Theft, FIN. 
TIMES (London), Sept. 29, 2003, at 14 (“[C]opyright law is not a commandment 
of God or nature, like the prohibition against murder, or the theft of an ox or 
an ass or a wife.”). 
 56. WILLIAM PATRY, MORAL PANICS AND THE COPYRIGHT WARS 189 
(2009). 
 57. 33 U.S. 591, 672 (1834) (Thompson, J., dissenting). 
 58. Feist Publ’ns v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 349 (1991) (quoting 
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8). 
 59. Sarl Louis Feraud Int’l v. Viewfinder, Inc., 489 F.3d 474, 480 n.3 (2d 
Cir. 2007) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Gilliam v. Am. Broad. 
Co., 538 F.2d 14, 24 (2d Cir. 1976) (“American copyright law . . . does not rec-
ognize moral rights or provide a cause of action for their violation, since the 
law seeks to vindicate the economic, rather than the personal, rights of au-
thors.”).  
 60. See ROBERT MERGES, JUSTIFYING INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 2 (2011) 
(“Current convention has it that IP law seeks to maximize the net social bene-
fit of the practices it regulates.”); MADHAVI SUNDER, FROM GOODS TO THE 
GOOD LIFE 11 (2012) (“Intellectual property scholars today focus on a single 
goal: efficiency.”); Roberta Rosenthal Kwall, Inspiration and Innovation: The 
Intrinsic Dimension of the Artistic Soul, 81 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1945, 1946 
(2006) (“Copyright’s provision of economic incentives is consistent with its un-
derlying utilitarian philosophy.”). 
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where U.S. copyright law and scholarship do seem to take ac-
count of moral considerations are often used to provide evi-
dence that the rest of the law is amoral. The most conspicuous 
black-letter-law example is the Visual Artists Rights Act 
(VARA).61 This statute incorporates into the U.S. Code some of 
the integrity and attribution rights enjoyed by authors in for-
eign “moral rights” regimes,62 though its substantive scope is 
narrow, and litigants have rarely invoked it. With its reverence 
for concepts that spring from the natural rights justifications 
for copyright, VARA is depicted as an island of morality in U.S. 
copyright law’s amoral sea. Interestingly, despite its natural 
rights justifications, violations of VARA are subject to the same 
market-based remedies as traditional copyright infringement.63 
Whether from those who approve or disapprove, the consensus 
is clear: American copyright law is concerned with the financial 
motivations of authors, and that means it operates outside the 
moral domain.64 
B. RECONCEIVING COPYRIGHT ACTORS 
For copyright law to best achieve its consequentialist aims, 
of course, its descriptive account of human motivation should 
be accurate. Copyright law attempts to manipulate people’s be-
 
 61. 17 U.S.C. § 106A (2012). 
 62. See Edward J. Damich, The Visual Artists Rights Act of 1990: Toward 
a Federal System of Moral Rights Protection for Visual Art, 39 CATH. U. L. 
REV. 945, 945–47 (1990). For an example of an artist’s successful assertion of a 
VARA claim, see Martin v. City of Indianapolis, 192 F.3d 608 (7th Cir. 1999) 
(holding that a city’s destruction of an artist’s public mural as part of urban 
renewal project violated VARA). 
 63. See 5 PATRY, supra note 35, § 16:46, at 16-92. Another example of a 
plausibly non-consequentialist doctrine in copyright law are rules allowing au-
thors to terminate transfers of their works after a certain period of time. 17 
U.S.C. § 203. These rules, which seek to give authors with poor bargaining 
power “another bite at the apple,” make little sense from a consequentialist 
perspective and are best understood as enacting a distributional preference for 
authors over publishers and producers. See Guy A. Rub, Stronger Than Kryp-
tonite: Inalienable Profit-Sharing Schemes in Copyright Law, 27 HARV. J.L. & 
TECH. 49, 51–64, (2013). 
 64. See sources cited supra notes 59–60; see also Sheldon W. Halpern, 
Copyright Law in the Digital Age: Malum In Se and Malum Prohibitum, 4 
MARQ. INTELL. PROP. L. REV. 1, 10–11 (2000) (premising a lecture on the no-
tion that copyright is malum prohibitum, not malum in se); Spangler, supra 
note 55 (“Americans see copyright as a money issue and not a moral issue”). 
See generally Russell J. DaSilva, Droit Moral and the Amoral Copyright: A 
Comparison of Artists’ Rights in France and the United States, 28 BULL. COP-
YRIGHT SOC’Y U.S.A. 1 (1980) (characterizing U.S. copyright generally as 
“amoral”). 
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havior through positive and negative incentives, so, for it to 
succeed, it must understand how people respond to those incen-
tives.65 In recent years, however, the rationalist, market-
oriented view of human behavior that undergirds copyright pol-
icy has been deeply undermined by empirical research from the 
social sciences. Humans, a group that includes copyright au-
thors, have been consistently shown to be much more compli-
cated than the standard view suggests.66 Rather than rationally 
computing costs and benefits and acting accordingly, people are 
influenced by a wide range of motivations and often act in ways 
that are clearly against their economic interests.67  
In the context of copyright law, a number of legal scholars 
have recently addressed the growing scientific literature on the 
role of incentives for promoting creativity.68 Contrary to John-
son’s dictum, people write, paint, and make movies for a host of 
reasons that have little to do with market compensation. More-
over, some empirical research suggests that receiving monetary 
payments for creativity can hinder rather than improve crea-
tive performance.69 
Much of the recent literature in this area has focused on 
qualitative empirical studies of creators’ stated motivations.70 
 
 65. Gregory N. Mandel, The Public Perception of Intellectual Property, 66 
FLA. L. REV. 261, 262 (2013). 
 66. See generally DANIEL KAHNEMAN, THINKING, FAST AND SLOW (2012) 
(cataloging the many heuristics and biases that affect judgment and decision-
making). 
 67. See Buccafusco & Sprigman, supra note 27, at 36–39; Christopher 
Buccafusco & Christopher Sprigman, Valuing Intellectual Property: An Exper-
iment, 96 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 23–25 (2010); Christopher Jon Sprigman, Chris-
topher Buccafusco & Zachary Burns, What’s a Name Worth?: Experimental 
Tests of the Value of Attribution in Intellectual Property, 93 B.U. L. REV. 1389, 
1405–20 (2013). 
 68. See, e.g., Fromer, supra note 5 (discussing the utility of expressive in-
centives in intellectual property); cf. Christopher Buccafusco, Zachary C. 
Burns, Jeanne C. Fromer & Christopher Jon Sprigman, Experimental Tests of 
Intellectual Property Laws’ Creativity Thresholds, 92 TEX. L. REV. 1921 (2014) 
(reporting results of experiments to determine the effects of incentives on cre-
ativity in the IP context). 
 69. Teresa M. Amabile, Effects of External Evaluation on Artistic Creativi-
ty, 37 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 221, 222 (1979) (finding that subjects 
acting with reward expectation are judged to produce significantly less crea-
tive work than those acting without reward expectation). For a discussion of 
this literature, see generally Buccafusco, Burns, Fromer & Sprigman, supra 
note 68. 
 70. See generally MIHALY CSIKSZENTMIHALYI, CREATIVITY: FLOW AND THE 
PSYCHOLOGY OF DISCOVERY AND INVENTION (1996) (describing the “flow theo-
ry” for the creative process). 
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In these studies, market-based incentives often play a limited 
role, at best, in people’s descriptions of why they create. Accord-
ing to Julie Cohen, “[c]reative people are much more apt to de-
scribe what they do as the product of desire, compulsion, or ad-
diction, and to understand particular results as heavily 
influenced by cultural, intellectual, and emotional serendipi-
ty.”71 Similarly, Rebecca Tushnet documents the role of “play” 
and the desire for cultural engagement in motivating creators.72 
In a recently published empirical study, Jessica Silbey inter-
viewed dozens of creators about the role that IP laws play in 
their lives and work.73 Rather than following the accepted in-
centives story, their accounts of the creative process are “tem-
poral, emergent, multiple, and moral.”74 Silbey notes that the 
“diverse narrative explanations undermine the one-
dimensional IP incentive story and belie the categorical princi-
ples of a legal approach that masks more complex realities.”75 
Further challenging the received wisdom of copyright’s in-
centives story is the large and rapidly expanding body of re-
search on intellectual property law’s “negative spaces”—areas 
of creative production that lack or do not use formal legal pro-
tection but still demonstrate substantial creativity.76 In fields 
like open source software,77 graffiti art,78 and fan fiction,79 the 
lack of legal protection means that creators see little or no 
monetary return from their creativity. Nonetheless, these areas 
exhibit substantial creativity and growth, suggesting that crea-
tors are motivated by other market and non-market desires. 
 
 71. Julie E. Cohen, Copyright As Property in the Post-Industrial Economy: 
A Research Agenda, 2011 WIS. L. REV. 141, 143. Cohen goes on to propose that 
copyright should instead be used to “enable the provision of capital and organ-
ization so that creative work may be exploited,” so that it “creates a foundation 
for predictability in the organization of cultural production, something par-
ticularly important in capital-intensive industries like film production.” Id. 
 72. Tushnet, supra note 4, at 527. 
 73. JESSICA SILBEY, THE EUREKA MYTH: CREATORS, INNOVATORS, AND 
EVERYDAY INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY (2015). 
 74. Id. at 16. 
 75. Id. 
 76. See generally RAUSTIALA & SPRIGMAN, supra note 9 (summarizing 
much of this research). 
 77. Yochai Benkler, Coase’s Penguin, or, Linux and The Nature of the 
Firm, 112 YALE L.J. 369, 372–73 (2002). 
 78. Al Roundtree, Graffiti Artists “Get Up” in Intellectual Property’s Nega-
tive Space, 31 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 959, 961 (2013). 
 79. Anupam Chander & Madhavi Sunder, Everyone’s a Superhero: A Cul-
tural Theory of “Mary Sue” Fan Fiction As Fair Use, 95 CALIF. L. REV. 597, 
612 (2007); Tushnet, supra note 4, at 531. 
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They experience internal satisfaction from the act of creating,80 
they value the social aspects of being part of a creative commu-
nity, and they desire having a strong reputation within that 
community. 
In many contexts perhaps, the pecuniary monetary incen-
tives protected by copyright law are doing little to increase cre-
ative production, and they may be harming it. Since copyright 
protection is costly, for the reasons discussed above, it should 
be reduced or even eliminated if it is not producing substantial 
incentive effects.81 According to this research, state interference 
in the market for creativity is an evil when it cannot be shown 
to be a good.82 Other scholars have suggested ways that copy-
right law could be restructured to take into account authors’ 
heterogeneous motivations.83 For example, Jeanne Fromer has 
proposed offering “expressive incentives,” including default at-
tribution rights that “convey solicitude for and effectuate [au-
thors’] personhood and labor interests, thereby maximizing the 
 
 80. Jürgen Bitzer et al., Intrinsic Motivation in Open Source Software De-
velopment, 35 J. COMP. ECON. 160, 167 (2007) (finding that “the fun of pro-
gramming is a major motivational driver” for open source software program-
mers); Karim R. Lakhani & Robert G. Wolf, Why Hackers Do What They Do: 
Understanding Motivation and Effort in Free/Open Source Software Projects, 
in PERSPECTIVES ON FREE AND OPEN SOURCE SOFTWARE 3 (J. Feller et al. 
eds., 2005) (“We find . . . that enjoyment-based intrinsic motivation—namely, 
how creative a person feels when working on the project—is the strongest and 
most persuasive driver.”). 
 81. Johnson, supra note 6, at 625; Diane Leenheer Zimmerman, Copy-
rights As Incentives: Did We Just Imagine That?, 12 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES 
L. 29, 43 (2011). Some of the literature on IP’s negative spaces has suggested 
that the informal norms that operate in the absence of formal IP protection 
may be over-protective relative to copyright law. For example, informal norms 
systems might prevent some kinds of conduct that would otherwise be tolerat-
ed by formal copyright law, including copying ideas and parody. See Dotan 
Oliar & Christopher Sprigman, There’s No Free Laugh (Anymore): The Emer-
gence of Intellectual Property Norms and the Transformation of Stand-Up 
Comedy, 94 VA. L. REV. 1787, 1823 (2008) (“[C]omedians’ norm system does 
not merely exceed the scope of copyright law but extends also to the type of 
appropriation typically dealt with under the heading of plagiarism . . . .”). 
 82. To paraphrase OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON LAW 96 
(1881). 
 83. Cohen, supra note 71; Lydia Pallas Loren, The Pope’s Copyright? 
Aligning Incentives with Reality by Using Creative Motivation To Shape Copy-
right Protection, 69 LA. L. REV. 1, 4 (2008) (arguing for thinner copyright pro-
tection for works that did not require copyright incentives in order to be creat-
ed and distributed); Gregory N. Mandel, To Promote the Creative Process: 
Intellectual Property Law and the Psychology of Creativity, 86 NOTRE DAME L. 
REV. 1999, 2008 (2011) (describing the difference between internal and exter-
nal motivation). 
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creative incentive for the benefit of society.”84 Under this pro-
posal, copyright law’s normative consequentialism is main-
tained, but it attempts to achieve that goal through a more nu-
anced and accurate understanding of authors’ behavior. 
C. TOWARDS A BEHAVIORALLY REALISTIC PICTURE OF  
COPYRIGHT LITIGATION 
The research discussed above highlights stark divergences 
between copyright law’s assumptions about authors’ creative 
incentives and the social scientific account of creative motiva-
tion. If copyright law’s incentives regime is doing a poor job of 
encouraging creativity, then the tradeoffs at the system’s foun-
dation will fail. Perhaps more important to fully understanding 
owners’ incentives, however, is what happens after copyrights 
are granted—an issue scholars have yet to fully explore. The 
law allows authors to sue for unauthorized use of their works in 
order to prevent harm to certain markets. By preventing others 
from copying a work in ways that will substitute for sales of the 
author’s work, authors’ incentives to create are preserved. Cop-
yright law assumes that authors will only object to uses of their 
works that threaten these sorts of market substitution harms.85 
This Article proves that assumption wrong. 
Just as people create for a variety of different reasons, they 
also object to people using their creations for many reasons. 
Some objections to copyright infringement are based on reasons 
that flow directly from the law’s concern about substitutionary 
copying. For example, when the manufacturer of the popular 
“Beanie Babies” stuffed animals sued a competitor who was 
making very similar toys, the plaintiff was clearly concerned 
that consumers would purchase the defendant’s product in-
stead of its own.86 Similarly, the concerns of the recording and 
motion picture industries about online file sharing primarily 
arise from anxieties that consumers will not purchase content 
when it is freely available, thereby undermining revenues and 
harming creative incentives. But, as the examples in the Intro-
 
 84. Fromer, supra note 5, at 1764. But see Sprigman, Buccafusco & Burns, 
supra note 67, at 1426–31 (relying on empirical data to argue that offering de-
fault attribution rights could impair licensing of works and produce market 
inefficiencies). 
 85. The fair use and remedial doctrines discussed above are intended to 
isolate market-based harms as the only compensable aspects of copyright in-
fringement. Since owners cannot recover for non-market injuries, they pre-
sumably lack the incentive to bring suit. 
 86. See Ty, Inc. v. GMA Accessories, Inc., 132 F.3d 1167 (7th Cir. 1997). 
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duction indicate, many authors object to copyright infringement 
not because it harms the market for their works, but instead 
because they believe that the use is unfair, immoral, or ob-
scene. And infringement suits—and even threats of infringe-
ment suits—that are rooted in motivations unrelated to pre-
serving owners’ financial interests in their works tend to 
undermine copyright’s goal of optimizing creative production. 
This hypothetical has real-world analogues. The Church of 
Scientology has frequently sued for copyright infringement 
when its ex-members have published its materials online to ex-
press their concern over its practices,87 as have other church-
es.88 And other examples of infringement litigation motivated 
by non-market harm abound. Some such lawsuits have target-
ed uses of copyrighted works that the owners considered de-
meaning or “tarnishing” of the original. Frederick Hart’s law-
suit against Warner Brothers for including obscene variations 
on his sculptures in a film scene clearly derived from his sense 
that the unauthorized use offended his Christian sensibilities.89 
Relatedly, a group of Hollywood directors concerned about the 
artistic integrity of their works used copyright law to enjoin 
(and, eventually, put out of business) a company that created 
family-friendly versions of films90—even though doing so intro-
 
 87. E.g., Religious Tech. Ctr. v. Netcom On-Line Commc’n Servs., Inc., 
907 F. Supp. 1361 (N.D. Cal. 1995) (describing a lawsuit against an operator of 
an online network for storing users’ files that contained material critical of 
Scientology). The Church of Scientology also frequently threatens infringe-
ment lawsuits as a way of combating critical uses of its materials, which 
amounts to an even more cost-effective way to leverage its copyrights to sup-
press dissent. E.g., Nick Denton, Church of Scientology Claims Copyright In-
fringement, GAWKER (Jan. 16, 2008), http://gawker.com/5002319/church-of 
-scientology-claims-copyright-infringement (noting numerous threats of suit 
against publisher of a biography of Tom Cruise that exposed many of Scientol-
ogy’s secrets, as well as media outlets that reported on the work). 
 88. The Mormon Church has also sued ex-members who have published 
its internal documents in critical contexts. One couple faced such an infringe-
ment suit that it resolved in an undisclosed settlement when the Church’s suit 
survived a motion to dismiss. See Intellectual Reserve, Inc. v. Utah Lighthouse 
Ministry, Inc., 75 F. Supp. 2d 1290 (D. Utah 1999); see also Ben Fulton, The 
Tanners’ Uneasy Settlement, SALT LAKE CITY WKLY. (Dec. 7, 2000), http://web 
.archive.org/web/20010215144156/http://www.avenews.com/editorial/no/cw/ 
city/city_2_001207.cfm (discussing this case and concluding that for the Mor-
mon Church, “[c]opyright litigation is becoming one of the most effective ways 
of silencing critics”). 
 89. See infra notes 165–66 and accompanying text (discussing this case). 
 90. Clean Flicks of Colo., LLC v. Soderbergh, 433 F. Supp. 2d 1236 (D. 
Colo. 2006). 
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duced the directors’ works to new and lucrative markets.91 A ce-
lebrity couple angered by paparazzi taking photos of their se-
cret nuptials recently acquired the rights to the offending im-
ages and successfully shut down publication of them.92 J.D. 
Salinger leveraged his exclusive rights to suppress a sequel to 
Catcher in the Rye that posed a negligible threat to the value of 
the original.93 Copyright infringement suits rooted in non-
pecuniary motivations continue to proliferate94: they include a 
pro-choice group suing a pro-life group for its criticism of the 
former’s videos;95 Michael Savage suing the Council on Ameri-
can-Islamic Relations to facilitate his anti-Muslim rants;96 a 
widow suing a documentarian whose film painted an unflatter-
ing portrait of her deceased husband;97 and songwriters Don 
Henley and Jackson Browne suing politicians whose views they 
dislike for using their works at campaign rallies.98 
Although copyright law’s normative structure is organized 
around harms to creative incentives, copyright law doctrine 
does little to police plaintiffs’ plural motivations for bringing in-
fringement suits. Copyright infringement is generally believed 
to be a strict liability offense.99 If the defendant has infringed 
one of the plaintiff’s exclusive rights, she will be prima facie li-
 
 91. See David Fagundes, Market Harm, Market Help and Fair Use, 17 
STAN. TECH. L. REV. 359, 366 (2014) (discussing the financial upsides of Clean 
Flicks for film copyright owners).  
 92. See Monge v. Maya Magazines, Inc., 688 F.3d 1164 (9th Cir. 2012). 
 93. Salinger v. Colting, 607 F.3d 68, 74 (2d Cir. 2010) (noting the district 
court’s finding that “60 Years Later is unlikely to impact the sales of Catcher 
itself”). 
 94. For an argument that such uses of copyright are increasing as owners 
seek to use their exclusive rights as a form of censorship, see John Tehranian, 
The New ©ensorship, 101 IOWA L. REV. 245 (2015). 
 95. Northland Family Planning Clinic, Inc. v. Ctr. for Bio-Ethical Reform, 
868 F. Supp. 2d 962 (C.D. Cal. 2012). 
 96. Savage v. Council on Am.-Islamic Relations, Inc., 87 U.S.P.Q.2d 
(BNA) 1730 (N.D. Cal. July 25, 2008). 
 97. Hofheinz v. AMC Prods., Inc., No. CV-00-5827 (CPS), 2003 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 16940 (E.D.N.Y. Apr. 21, 2003). 
 98. Henley v. DeVore, 733 F. Supp. 2d 1144 (C.D. Cal. 2010) (granting 
summary judgment on copyright infringement claim for unauthorized use of 
musical works in campaign ads for Republican Senate candidate Chuck 
DeVore); Browne v. McCain, 611 F. Supp. 2d 1073 (C.D. Cal. 2009) (denying 
motion to dismiss copyright infringement claims for unlicensed use of musical 
work in pro-McCain television ad). 
 99. See, e.g., David Fagundes, Crystals in the Public Domain, 50 B.C. L. 
REV. 139, 152 (2009) (“Direct copyright infringement remains a strict liability 
offense . . . .”). 
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able.100 More important, copyright plaintiffs are not required to 
show that they have suffered harm.101 Unlike many torts and 
property causes of action, copyright infringement will result in 
liability even if the plaintiff does not present evidence of 
harm.102 For example, if a defendant publicly displays the plain-
tiff’s copyrighted painting, proof of the unauthorized display es-
tablishes prima facie liability without a showing that the plain-
tiff suffered any kind of injury, financial or otherwise.103 
Fair use may provide some solace for defendants who find 
themselves sued for infringement despite the pecuniarily harm-
less character of their use. But courts are far from universally 
sympathetic to the defense, even when owners’ suits clearly 
seek to vindicate only noneconomic interests.104 And even when 
users successfully invoke this defense, they invariably have to 
expend enormous time and litigation costs to do so. Green Day, 
for example, recently prevailed on a fair use defense in a law-
suit filed by an artist who felt that their unlicensed use of his 
work in a concert backdrop “tarnished” his image.105 Pursuing 
this issue through appeal to the Ninth Circuit is possible, 
though costly, for internationally famous bands; for the average 
 
 100. Christina Bohannan & Herbert Hovenkamp, IP and Antitrust: Refor-
mation and Harm, 51 B.C. L. REV. 905, 973 (2010) (“A copyright holder can 
enjoin or demand royalties for virtually any copying, regardless of whether 
that copying was of a kind likely to harm the copyright holder’s incentives to 
innovate.”). 
 101. See 17 U.S.C. § 501(a) (2012) (“Anyone who violates any of the exclu-
sive rights of the copyright owner . . . is an infringer of the copyright . . . .”).  
 102. Christina Bohannan, Copyright Harm and Injunctions, 30 CARDOZO 
ARTS & ENT. L.J. 11, 14 (2012) (“Copyright plaintiffs are not required to prove 
that allegedly infringing uses of copyrighted material cause any meaningful 
harm to them or their incentives to produce creative works. The copyright 
plaintiff must merely prove copying, and sometimes very little copying will 
suffice.”). 
 103. Furthermore, prima facie liability will exist even if there is reason to 
believe that the defendant’s behavior helped the copyright owner. See 
Fagundes, supra note 91, at 363–64. 
 104. E.g., Monge v. Maya Magazines, Inc., 688 F.3d 1164, 1164 (9th Cir. 
2012) (rejecting the fair use defense despite works’ total lack of monetary val-
ue); Salinger v. Colting, 607 F.3d 68, 74 (2d Cir. 2010); see also Christina 
Bohannan, Copyright Infringement and Harmless Speech, 61 HASTINGS L.J. 
1083, 1099 (2010) (“Although harm to the market for the copyrighted work is 
one statutory factor that courts consider in fair use, it is not a strict require-
ment. By emphasizing other factors in the fair use test, a court may easily re-
ject fair use even when evidence of harm is absent or merely speculative. 
Moreover, what constitutes legally cognizable harm in copyright law is not 
well defined.”). 
 105. Seltzer v. Green Day, Inc., 725 F.3d 1170, 1179 (9th Cir. 2013). 
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person, it is likely impossible.106 Finally, since judges retain dis-
cretion to award or deny attorney’s fees and costs in copyright 
infringement suits, even defendants whose economically harm-
less uses are totally absolved of liability may find themselves 
bearing the substantial costs of their vindication.107  
Even the mere threat of infringement litigation that de-
rives from owners’ non-monetary interests can effectively sup-
press unauthorized use in a manner inconsistent with copy-
right’s aim of optimizing creative production. Users often lack 
the money to fund a legal defense of their conduct, and the un-
certainty of copyright law usually makes it a wiser decision 
simply to cease a given use rather than risk the hammer of 
massive statutory damages and outsized attorneys’ fees.108 To 
take just one example, the Dysfunctional Family Circus (DFC) 
was a delightfully ribald parody of the wholesome Family Cir-
cus cartoon.109 It exemplified the kind of non-substitutive, non-
commercial parody that epitomizes fair use. But when creator 
Bil Keane got wind of the often-prurient nature of the online 
parody, he engaged his publisher’s lawyers, and the mere 
threat of costly litigation soon rendered the impecunious DFC 
defunct.110 And an owner’s reputation for litigious behavior can 
lead to socially costly self-censorship. For example, the justified 
reputation of the Martin Luther King, Jr. estate to police use of 
King’s speeches in contexts that are not flattering to King and 
his family has prevented numerous artists from engaging with 
 
 106. See James Gibson, Risk Aversion and Rights Accretion in Intellectual 
Property Law, 116 YALE L.J. 882, 940–41 (2007). 
 107. Michael Savage has twice sued the Council on American-Islamic Rela-
tions (CAIR) for copyright infringement simply because CAIR has substantial-
ly quoted Savage’s words to argue that they represent dangerous hate speech. 
But while CAIR prevailed in these suits, the court denied their motion to have 
Savage bear their court costs and attorney’s fees, despite the judge’s conces-
sion that Savage’s copyright claim was “never strong and was litigated ane-
mically.” Savage v. Council on Am.-Islamic Relations, Inc., No. C 07-06076 SI, 
2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4926, at *1–3 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 26, 2009) (denying CAIR’s 
request for fees). 
 108. See Gibson, supra note 106, at 890. 
 109. For just one classic example, see DFC #311, DYSFUNCTIONAL FAMILY 
CIRCUS, http://dfc.furr.org/archive/311.html (last visited Apr. 19, 2016). 
 110. See Horselover Fat, DFC: The Elegy, ZOMPIST, http://www.zompist 
.com/dfcdead.html (last visited Apr. 19, 2016) (relating the story of the copy-
right threats that brought down the DFC). This is not always how these sto-
ries end. Jim Davis embraced the existential parody of his Garfield comic, 
Garfield Without Garfield, and teamed up with the latter’s creator to produce 
a successful book. See Michael Marotta, Garfield Minus Garfield Equals Book 
Deal, BOS. HERALD, Aug. 5, 2008, at 38. 
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King’s work. When Selma, a biopic about King’s life, was re-
leased in 2014, King’s speeches were rewritten and para-
phrased even though quotations would almost certainly have 
qualified as fair use.111 In both of these cases, the public lost ac-
cess to a richer creative milieu, though the copyright owners’ 
conduct did nothing to enhance or protect their creative incen-
tives. 
 
*** 
 
Copyright’s focus on pecuniary incentives has come under 
fire from numerous scholars who have illustrated the breadth 
of reasons that lead authors to create. But this critique gets to 
the flaws of only part of copyright’s incentives story. Law seeks 
to optimize creative production not only with the carrot of ex-
clusive rights for future works of authorship, but also with the 
stick of heavy sanctions for unauthorized use of those works. 
Part I begins a critical conversation about the second half of the 
incentives story. It has shown that just as copyright law as-
sumes that authors are encouraged to create primarily in re-
sponse to financial rewards, it also relies on the central propo-
sition that authors sue primarily to remedy harm to their 
monopolies over works of authorship. But if this assumption 
proves false, it would raise concerns serious enough to under-
mine copyright’s aims of optimizing creative production. The 
existence of numerous infringement lawsuits spurred by non-
pecuniary motivations, discussed throughout this Part, raises a 
strong inference that plural motivations underlie owners’ deci-
sions to seek infringement remedies. Part II seeks to explore, 
and fully theorize, those motivations.  
II.  THE MORAL FOUNDATIONS OF COPYRIGHT 
INFRINGEMENT   
Part I introduced the idea that copyright law is rooted in a 
monetary, market-oriented vision of why owners sue that fails 
to describe the range of motivations underlying infringement 
actions. But what explains this puzzling slippage between cop-
yright’s presumptions about infringement and why owners ac-
tually file infringement suits? This Part answers that question 
 
 111. See Jonathan Band, How Copyright Forced a Filmmaker To Rewrite 
Martin Luther King’s Historic Words, TECHDIRT (Dec. 30, 2014), https://www 
.techdirt.com/articles/20141229/13390429545/how-copyright-forced-filmmaker 
-to-rewrite-martin-luther-king.shtml. 
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in two ways. First, it reflects on the scholarship that has noted 
different kinds of copyright infringement matters (both threats 
of suit and filed cases) motivated by non-monetary considera-
tions, observing that none of them explain—or even explore—
the foundational motivations underlying these different mat-
ters. Second, this Part looks to recent work in moral psychology 
to provide such a unified account. Cognitive science has shown 
that morality is a fundamental part of how people experience 
transgressions, including copyright infringement. These innate 
moral intuitions explain why owners inevitably object to in-
fringement not only when it causes economic loss, but also 
when it engages ethical considerations like violated purity and 
betrayed loyalty, reciprocal fairness and subversion of authori-
ty. This map of copyright’s moral domain enables us to consider 
how to construct authorial incentives in ways that account for 
owners’ moral intuitions about infringement.112  
A. LOCATING MORALITY WITHIN THE COPYRIGHT SKEIN 
We are not the first to recognize that owners frequently file 
copyright suits for motives unrelated to monetary loss. Numer-
ous commentators have observed this fact, typically in order to 
highlight the social problems that arise when owners leverage 
copyright law for purposes unrelated to protecting their crea-
tive incentives. John Tehranian, for example, has detailed the 
capacity of copyright law to suppress political dissent or any 
other expression with which owners disagree, rendering copy-
right an engine of censorship rather than an incentive for crea-
tive production.113 Christina Bohannan has written about this 
issue from a more theoretical perspective, noting numerous in-
fringement lawsuits where owners appear to experience no pe-
cuniary loss, and seeking to solve this problem by developing “a 
theory of [pecuniary] harm that can give effect to its constitu-
tional purpose.”114 In a different vein, Amy Adler has argued 
 
 112. This account is largely limited to individual owners’ intuitions about 
copyright infringement. Corporate owners likely tend to be driven more by pe-
cuniary cost-benefit considerations than by moral psychology. We are grateful 
to Neil Netanel for raising this distinction. 
 113. Tehranian, supra note 94, at 250 (“[C]opyright law has become the 
weapon par excellence of the 21st-century censor.”); see also Neil Weinstock 
Netanel, Locating Copyright Within the First Amendment Skein, 54 STAN. L. 
REV. 1 (2001) (discussing the effects of copyright infringement litigation on 
free speech). 
 114. Christina Bohannan, Copyright Harm, Foreseeability, and Fair Use, 
85 WASH. U. L. REV. 969, 969 (2007). 
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that laws enabling artists to vindicate the integrity of their 
works via moral rights protections tend to suppress the kinds of 
critical conversations that are the lifeblood of creative progress, 
citing numerous instances of filed suits that have had this ef-
fect.115 And Jeanne Fromer has shown that despite U.S. copy-
right law’s absence of attribution rights, authors still possess a 
powerful desire to be associated with their works,116 which has 
likely led to attempts to seek attribution via other doctrinal 
means.117 
These accounts all seek to describe the same phenomenon: 
Overreaching owners suing or threatening to sue users for rea-
sons unrelated to their monetary interests in their works of au-
thorship, thereby undermining copyright law’s aim of optimiz-
ing creative production. While all of this work identifies the 
existence of such suits and the social costs they exact, none of it 
addresses the mechanism that underlies these overreaching as-
sertions of owners’ rights.118 Because these projects are con-
cerned with the social problem of excessive copyright lawsuits, 
they typically stop short of examining why owners file those 
suits. Some of this scholarship conjectures about these motiva-
tions but invariably fails to situate them in the context of any 
theoretical framework that can provide evidentiary support for 
their explanatory assertions or help predict more generally why 
infringement lawsuits happen in the absence of pecuniary in-
centives.119 
Prevailing scholarship, in sum, lacks a coherent and sys-
tematic account of why copyright owners file or threaten in-
 
 115. See Amy Adler, Against Moral Rights, 97 CALIF. L. REV. 263, 279–94 
(2009). 
 116. See Fromer, supra note 5, at 1764–81. 
 117. Cf., e.g., Gilliam v. Am. Broad. Co., Inc., 538 F.2d 14, 17 (2d Cir. 1976) 
(holding that ABC’s editing of three Monty Python programs “impaired the 
integrity of the original work,” entitling Monty Python to a preliminary in-
junction restraining ABC from broadcasting them). 
 118. Fromer does provide an account for authors’ incentives that is rooted 
in non-pecuniary motivations, such as the desire to be publicly recognized for 
one’s work. See Fromer, supra note 5, at 1767–70. But this is an explanation of 
why authors create works, not why owners sue for their infringement, which 
merely highlights the same asymmetry we discuss in the Introduction. See su-
pra text accompanying notes 7–12 (observing that the secondary literature 
brims with accounts of why authors create but is puzzlingly bereft of accounts 
of why they sue). 
 119. See, e.g., Tehranian, supra note 94, at 281 (asserting, plausibly but 
without evidentiary support, that in many copyright suits, “rightsholders are 
acting, at least partially, on non-economic dignity or privacy interests that 
courts have deemed [whether rightfully or wrongfully] legitimate”). 
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fringement suits. This Article seeks to locate just such an ex-
planation, one that can not only make sense of past and present 
infringement controversies, but that can also provide an ongo-
ing framework for law’s remedies for infringement. Because 
this is ultimately a question about motivation to seek redress, 
it requires that we look to research about what causes people to 
feel that they have been wronged. We thus locate our account 
in moral psychology, the field that examines people’s intuitions 
about right and wrong as a phenomenon of the mind, not just 
as a matter of analytical philosophy. In particular, we turn to 
an emergent variant of moral psychology, moral foundations 
theory (MFT), that seeks to identify the particular intuitions 
that drive our moral reasoning.120 MFT suggests that there are 
at least six different moral foundations that may be activated 
when people perceive certain patterns in the social world, and 
that these patterns in turn guide their instinctive judgments of 
right and wrong.121 The six foundations identified by MFT re-
search are: 
 care/harm (concern that people and objects of value 
are cared for, and not harmed);  
 fairness/cheating (concern that people behave in con-
cert with reciprocity norms such as tit-for-tat and the 
Golden Rule);  
 sanctity/degradation (concern that people seek to re-
main pure and avoid sullying sacred things); 
 
 120. A major premise of moral foundations theory is that our beliefs about 
morality are primarily a product of intuition rather than reason. Jonathan 
Haidt & Craig Joseph, Intuitive Ethics: How Innately Prepared Intuitions Gen-
erate Culturally Variable Virtues, DAEDALUS, Fall 2004, at 55, 56. 
 121. Initial work suggested only five moral foundations, hence the refer-
ence to five such foundations in this article: Spassena P. Koleva et al., Tracing 
the Threads: How Five Moral Concerns (Especially Purity) Help Explain Cul-
ture War Attitudes, 46 J. RES. PERSONALITY 184 (2012). 
Later work has reconfigured the moral foundations slightly to reveal a to-
tal of six. See JONATHAN HAIDT, THE RIGHTEOUS MIND: WHY GOOD PEOPLE 
ARE DIVIDED BY POLITICS AND RELIGION 181–84 (2012) (making the case for a 
sixth moral foundation looking to liberty and oppression). MFT’s leading 
scholars have emphasized that their claim is that there are at least six moral 
foundations, and that there may be more. See Graham et al., supra note 15, at 
104 (“MFT has never claimed to offer an exclusive list of moral foundations.”). 
Other possibilities—called “candidate foundations”—remain under considera-
tion. Id. at 104–07 (discussing candidate foundations such as efficiency/waste 
and ownership/theft). MFT is not, of course, without its critics, some of whom 
argue that all moral instincts derive from concerns about harm. E.g., Kurt 
Gray et al., Mind Perception Is the Essence of Morality, 23 PSYCHOL. INQUIRY 
101, 118 (2012). 
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 authority/subversion (concern that people defer to le-
gitimate authority figures and socially recognized hier-
archies);  
 loyalty/disloyalty (concern that people remain loyal to 
relevant in-groups like nations or families); and  
 liberty/oppression (concern that people remain free 
from being forced to do things by overbearing authori-
ties).122 
These six moral foundations operate like ethical taste 
buds.123 Just as different people may especially like sweet fla-
vors or be particularly disgusted by bitter ones, so may differ-
ent people be especially morally compelled by acts of loyalty or 
be particularly offended by impurity. Different people will fea-
ture different degrees of sensitivity to different moral founda-
tions,124 so that what seems right to one person may seem glar-
ingly wrong to another.125 Of course, multiple moral foundations 
may undergird intuitions that a behavior is wrong, so that it 
may be difficult to specify which particular foundations are do-
ing the moral work, especially since we may not be aware of 
what moral intuitions are driving our attitudes.126 Finally, 
 
 122. Graham et al., supra note 14, at 368–79 (testing the validity of the 
foundations using the Moral Foundations Questionnaire (MFQ) and conclud-
ing that “the MFQ is clearing a high bar in providing unique predictive validi-
ty for outcomes relevant for moral and political psychology”). We define and 
explain each of these moral foundations more extensively in infra Part B.  
 123. See HAIDT, supra note 121, at 115 (referring to moral foundations as 
“moral taste receptors”).  
 124. Importantly, people tend to feature arrays of any or all of the six mor-
al foundations, not just one to the exclusion of the other five. Some people’s 
moral sensibility may be largely driven by care/harm, while others’ may fea-
ture authority/subversion, loyalty/disloyalty and purity/degradation, for ex-
ample. This different sensitivity to different moral foundations among groups 
may help to explain, for example, the wide (and increasing) gulf between lib-
erals and conservatives in American politics. See Graham et al., supra note 14. 
 125. Peter H. Ditto & Spassena P. Koleva, Moral Empathy Gaps and the 
American Culture War, 3 EMOTION REV. 331, 332 (2011) (“When people exas-
perated from a heated political argument exclaim that their opponents ‘just 
don’t get it,’ moral intuitions are almost always the ineffable ‘it’ the opponents 
don’t ‘get.’”). For instance, one recent study found that the sancti-
ty/degradation moral foundation predicted disapproval for gay marriage more 
than any other foundation, suggesting that opposition to gay marriage is most 
prominent among people who consider homosexuality impure and/or gay un-
ions a degradation of the institution of marriage. See Koleva et al., supra note 
121, at 188 (“[T]he debate about same-sex relationships and marriage evokes 
concerns about [various foundations], yet both are by far best predicted by Pu-
rity.”). 
 126. See Koleva et al., supra note 121, at 188 (pointing out that MFT re-
search indicates that “attitudes on moral and political issues may have intui-
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while MFT assumes that people’s moral intuitions and their 
sensitivities to different foundations are organized in advance 
of experiences of the world, those intuitions may still be shaped 
to some extent by the cultures and environments in which peo-
ple are raised.127  
Our account of why copyright owners seek remedies for in-
fringement derives from the insight of MFT research that peo-
ple’s responses to transgression—such as the unauthorized use 
of their works of authorship—are inevitably and richly moral.128 
This assertion flows naturally from a mountain of psychological 
evidence about human motivation, but it lies at odds with the 
collective opinion of copyright scholarship,129 which casually re-
gards copyright infringement as a mere economic injury with 
narrow moral valence.130 One advantage of looking at copyright 
through the lens of MFT is that it corrects this misapprehen-
sion and places the idea of morality in its proper place in copy-
right analysis. Importantly, though, we do not claim that law 
should provide remedies that reflexively track any moral out-
rage an owner experiences. Rather, as Part III explores in more 
detail, we argue that because owners inevitably possess moral-
ly charged reactions to infringement, copyright law must rec-
ognize this reality in order to achieve its consequentialist aims. 
MFT bears other advantages as a theoretical framework 
for mapping out the domain of owners’ psychological reactions 
to copyright infringement. For one thing, as its name suggests, 
 
tive bases of which we are not aware”). 
 127. Intuitions are like a “first draft” of our morality, which will inevitably 
be revised by our life experience. GARY MARCUS, THE BIRTH OF THE MIND 34, 
40 (2004). So for example, people who grow up in strongly religious communi-
ties are likely to be more sensitive to violations of authority and purity than 
are people who grow up in secular communities, regardless of their innate 
moral intuitions. 
 128. A number of recent studies have indeed shown that copyright-relevant 
behavior is bound up with moral instincts for adults and even for children. 
See, e.g., Kristina R. Olson & Alex Shaw, “No Fair, Copycat!”: What Children’s 
Response to Plagiarism Tells Us About Their Understanding of Ideas, 14 DEV. 
SCI. 431 (2011); Alex Shaw et al., Children Apply Principles of Physical Own-
ership to Ideas, 36 COGNITIVE SCI. 1383 (2012). 
 129. There is a vocal minority of scholars who stress an alternative, moral-
rights vision of copyright. See, e.g., Kwall, supra note 60; see also sources cited 
infra notes 206–07. This approach better captures the plurality of owners’ in-
stincts about infringement—such as the dignitary harm inflicted by unauthor-
ized use—but is more concerned about articulating a series of authorial enti-
tlements and thus lacks the kind of psychological account of intuitive reactions 
to infringement that we supply here.  
 130. See supra Part I.A (citing scholarship and judicial opinions stating 
that copyright is a merely economic issue with no moral valence). 
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MFT is a theory about moral foundations. It seeks to identify 
the ultimate roots of our ethical intuitions, including the moral 
outrage that owners often express when their works are used 
without authorization. MFT thus makes sense of the full range 
of moral intuitions at play in copyright infringement and illus-
trates the poverty of law’s current assumption that owners will 
sue only when their copyright monopoly is threatened. In addi-
tion, MFT provides an evidence-based way of explaining why 
and when owners are likely to bring infringement suits. While 
current scholarship assays plausible guesses about the motiva-
tions underlying objections to unauthorized use, MFT supplies 
a framework rooted in empirical analysis and social science 
that can answer this question more rigorously. Finally, MFT 
provides a systematic account of ethical instincts, including 
owners’ intuitions that infringement of their works is wrongful. 
While researchers in the field have stopped short of asserting 
that the list of fundamental moral intuitions is exhaustive, the 
theory does depend on the premise that there are a finite and 
identifiable number of such bases. MFT thus allows us to make 
sense of owners’ moral intuitions in a way that enables system-
atic, rather than ad hoc, understanding of them retrospectively. 
Thus, it also permits us to develop rules and remedies that take 
those intuitions into account. With this understanding of the 
relationship between copyright and morality in mind, we now 
turn to a detailed account of how MFT makes sense of the fun-
damental intuitions animating copyright infringement. 
B. MAPPING COPYRIGHT INFRINGEMENT’S MORAL DOMAIN  
With the tools MFT provides, we can begin the systematic 
study of moral intuitions about copyright infringement. A 
number of clarifications are in order before we proceed to that 
analysis. First, we are not claiming that each of the moral 
foundations is equally responsible for people’s moral intuitions 
about copyright. The care/harm and fairness/cheating founda-
tions unquestionably do a lot of the moral heavy lifting, at least 
in the U.S. Nonetheless, the other moral foundations arise reg-
ularly and often seem to determine why people have moral ob-
jections to uses of their works that cause no monetary harm. 
Second, our approach to understanding how different moral 
foundations affect people’s judgments about copyright issues 
centers on what those owners affected by infringement write 
and say. This includes the writings of judges and legislators, 
but necessarily also encompasses what owners, users, and the 
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public say about unauthorized use. In order to study the role of 
moral foundations in shaping people’s judgments, we often fo-
cus on the metaphors that people use to talk about copyright. 
Metaphors are an especially rich source of evidence about mor-
al intuitions because they reveal subconscious or intuitive rela-
tionships between abstract concepts and moral judgments.131 
Indeed, some neuropsychological research suggests that people 
cannot organize their thinking about complex issues, such as 
morality, without resort to the kind of categories and patterns 
that metaphors facilitate.132 With these qualifications in mind, 
we now take up our analysis of copyright law’s moral founda-
tions. 
1. The Care/Harm Foundation 
A major driver of many people’s moral intuitions is concern 
that people be cared for, and, conversely, that they not be 
harmed. This foundation features centrally in moral intuitions 
about copyright. Indeed, the straight “utilitarian bargain” story 
is often interpreted as a narrative about harm, and in particu-
lar about preventing pecuniary harm to authors who will be 
undercompensated in the absence of exclusive rights.133 This 
kind of moral appeal shows up most consistently in the testi-
mony and public statements of content industry representa-
tives who are seeking support for stronger laws against unau-
thorized use of creative works. As one industry representative 
put it, “[o]nline piracy harms the artists, both the famous and 
struggling, who create content.”134 The Recording Industry As-
sociation of America (RIAA) has described infringement as 
 
 131. Jonathan Haidt, The Emotional Dog and Its Rational Tail: A Social 
Intuitionist Approach to Moral Judgment, 108 PSYCH. REV. 814, 835 (2001) 
(“Metaphors have entailments, and much of moral argument and persuasion 
involves trying to get the other person to apply the right metaphor.”). 
 132. HOWARD MARGOLIS, PATTERNS, THINKING, AND COGNITION: A THEORY 
OF JUDGMENT 1 (1987). 
 133. For one such expression of the “utilitarian bargain,” see Dave 
Fagundes & Jonathan S. Masur, Costly Intellectual Property, 65 VAND. L. REV. 
677, 678–79 (2012). 
 134. DANIEL CASTRO, THE INFO. TECH. & INNOVATION FOUND., BETTER 
ENFORCEMENT OF ONLINE COPYRIGHT WOULD HELP, NOT HURT, CONSUMERS 
2 (2010). It bears noting that even the title of Castro’s article frames infringe-
ment in terms of harm and care. The Software & Information Industry Alli-
ance similarly framed infringement in terms of deprivation to artists. “When 
someone infringes a copyright, the copyright holder is effectively deprived of 
income . . . .” The Content Infringement Problem, SIAA IP PROTECTION, http:// 
www.siia.net/Divisions/IP-Protection-Services/About/The-Content 
-Infringement-Problem (last visited Apr. 19, 2016). 
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“devastating” creators.135 The standard argument that artists 
suffer from unauthorized use finds a particularly pathos-
inducing corollary in content industry representatives’ invoca-
tion of harm to the “little guy” who serves a humble role in the 
entertainment world (sound engineer assistant, boom mic oper-
ator), and who may lose his job if infringement drives recording 
companies or film studios out of business.136 These appeals also 
stress the harm to the consuming public that will accrue if in-
fringement proliferates. “Piracy,” one industry source warns, 
“ultimately also hurts law-abiding consumers who must . . . 
compensate for the costs of piracy.”137 This strategy represents 
an especially effective invocation of the care/harm narrative be-
cause it makes listeners not just concerned that others will be 
hurt, but that they themselves will suffer. 
The relative sobriety of these appeals pales in comparison 
to the more dramatic attempts to inflame public sentiment 
about infringement using threats of dire harm. The most infa-
mous is Jack Valenti’s 1982 congressional testimony in which 
he asserted that “the VCR [i]s to the American film producer 
and the American public as the Boston strangler is to the wom-
an at home alone.”138 Valenti’s analogy accessed the care/harm 
moral foundation in the most visceral possible way, associating 
the VCR with the specter of a violent criminal threatening to 
sexually assault and murder a vulnerable victim. Content in-
dustry representatives continue to use language designed to 
trigger moral intuitions against harm. The most frequently in-
 
 135. Peter Feuilherade, Online Piracy “Devastates” Music, BBC NEWS 
(Mar. 4, 2004, 13:15 GMT), http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/technology/3532891.stm. 
 136. Chris Dodd, Copyright—A Leading Force for Jobs, Innovation, and 
Growth, HUFFINGTON POST (Nov. 19, 2013, 11:21 AM ET), http://www 
.huffingtonpost.com/chris-dodd/copyright--a-leading-forc_b_4302882.html (up-
dated Jan. 25, 2014) (“And these are not just the famous people whose names 
and faces so many of us know, but the men and women sweating behind the 
scenes every day developing the latest software, building sets for films and TV 
shows, operating the lights and cameras, recording and producing the music 
we listen to, or publishing the latest books we love to read. These people pro-
vide the foundation of a healthy creative industry and they all depend on cop-
yright for their livelihoods.”). 
 137. CASTRO, supra note 134. Another industry organization warned that 
infringement is “hurting the economic growth of this country.” The Content 
Infringement Problem, supra note 134. 
 138. Home Recording of Copyrighted Works: Hearings on H.R. 4783, H.R. 
4794, H.R. 4808, H.R. 5250, H.R. 5488 and H.R. 5705 Before the Subcomm. on 
Courts, Civil Liberties & the Admin. of Justice of the H. Comm. on the Judici-
ary, 97th Cong. 8 (1982) [hereinafter Hearings on Home Recording] (statement 
of Jack Valenti, President, Motion Picture Association of America, Inc.). 
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voked metaphor is that infringement will not only harm, but 
will “kill” the entertainment industry as we know it.139 The 
lobbying group Morality in Media even intimated that wide-
spread infringement “facilitate[s] crimes against children.”140 
Industry appeals to children in this regard are particularly tell-
ing, because they are direct moral appeals unmediated by any 
sense of obligation to defer to the straight “utilitarian bargain” 
story. A suggested lesson plan for elementary school children 
designed to inculcate copyright values, for example, explained 
that copyright infringement is wrong because “real people like 
J.K. Rowling . . . are hurt when copies are made without the 
permission of the copyright owner.”141 
That copyright infringement touches on the care/harm 
moral foundation is not that surprising. The justification for 
the copyright monopoly rests on the assumption that infringe-
ment inflicts monetary harm on authors. But this one angle 
does not exhaust the variety of ways unauthorized copying im-
plicates this moral foundation.142 Artists whose work is copied 
without permission most often speak not in pecuniary terms 
but rather of a dignitary harm inflicted by the experience of 
having their work wrested from them and used—especially 
when modified—without their permission. Artist Chris Cooper, 
for example, explained that having his work copied made him 
feel like “somebody broke into your house and stole your ste-
 
 139. Examples abound. One computer developer stated that “piracy . . . 
killed a lot of great independent developers.” Tim Ingham, Epic: Piracy Has 
Killed Our Enthusiasm for PC, COMPUTERANDVIDEOGAMES.COM (May 18, 
2010, 11:46 AM), https://web.archive.org/web/20120424022401/http://www 
.computerandvideogames.com/247057/epic-piracy-has-killed-our-enthusi-asm 
-for-pc. And content industry lobbyists warned even before the advent of digi-
tal media that “home taping is killing music.” Ian Peel, Thought Home Taping 
Was Dead? Think Again…, GUARDIAN (June 17, 2008, 9:30 EDT) http://www 
.theguardian.com/music/2008/jun/17/popandrock. 
 140. Brief of Kids First Coal. et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioner 
at 1, Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913 (2005) (No. 
04-480), http://www.copyright.gov/docs/mgm/kidsfirst.pdf.  
 141. COPYRIGHT SOC’Y OF THE U.S.A., “HOW HARRY POTTER WAS BORN”: A 
RAGS TO RICHES COPYRIGHT STORY, DISCUSSION POINTS & QUIZ 3 (2006), 
http://www.richfield.k12.wi.us/UserFiles/Servers/Server_5626897/File/ 
Richfield%20school%20district/Cirillo/Computer/Middle_JK_Rowling_Story_ 
and_Quiz.pdf. 
 142. Though artists do, frequently, articulate their moral indignation about 
infringement in terms of concerns that they will be financially harmed by it. 
Wil Wheaton stated, “As an actor and writer, I have a personal stake in mak-
ing sure that [c]opyright law is enforced. If I can’t own the works I create, then 
I can’t feed my family.” Wil Wheaton, August 22, 2002, WIL WHEATON DOT 
NET (Aug. 22, 2002), http://www.wilwheaton.net/mt/archives/001096.php.  
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reo.”143 This reaction locates the harm of infringement as a de-
moralizing act of violation, not as a mere dollar cost. Indeed, 
many artists reject the argument that unauthorized use can 
help them by creating free PR,144 suggesting that the suffering 
felt by artists when their work is copied is more dignitary than 
economic.  
2. The Fairness/Cheating Foundation 
A second major basis for beliefs that something is morally 
wrong is that it triggers the fairness/cheating foundation, of-
fending basic principles of reciprocity—hence the equation of 
this foundation with “the law of karma.”145 Perhaps the best in-
dication of the presence of the fairness/cheating foundation in 
moral controversies about copyright is the frequency with 
which copyright infringement is equated with theft. As a legal 
matter, copyright violations are not the same as theft (or steal-
ing). The Copyright Act refers to violations of an owner’s exclu-
sive rights as infringement,146 while theft refers to the act of 
taking someone’s physical chattel property intentionally and 
without permission.147 Nevertheless, owners express their mor-
al outrage about unauthorized use by equating it with theft (or 
stealing, or sometimes also trespass) so frequently that the in-
fringement/stealing elision has become a standard moral ap-
peal in content industry rhetoric.148 And on the other side of the 
 
 143. Brian Doherty, An Artist on Getting Ripped Off, REASON (July 2013), 
http://www.reason.com/archives/2013/05/28/an-artist-on-getting-ripped-off 
(documenting an interview with artist Chris “Coop” Cooper).  
 144. Upon settling with clothing designer Jeremy Scott for his unauthor-
ized use of skateboard designs for Santa Cruz Skateboards and NHS, Inc. by 
Jim Phillips, NHS issued a statement indicating that they “do not believe in 
the idea that any publicity is good publicity. There was a lot of interest in this 
issue, but we do not need this type of PR to help grow our brands. It was actu-
ally quite damaging to us.” See Zahra Jamshed, Jeremy Scott and Santa Cruz 
Skateboards Reach Settlement over Plagiarism Claims, HYPEBEAST  
(Sept. 4, 2013), http://www.hypebeast.com/2013/9/jeremy-scott-and-santa-cruz 
-skateboards-reach-settlement-over-plagiarism-claims.  
 145. HAIDT, supra note 121, at 206. Other familiar moral bromides capture 
the essence of this moral foundation: “Do unto others as you would have them 
do unto you”; “do not reap where others have sown.” 
 146. 17 U.S.C. § 106 (2012). And the Supreme Court has held that copy-
righted works were not covered by a federal statute that criminalized the in-
terstate transportation of property. Dowling v. United States, 473 U.S. 207 
(1985). 
 147. E.g., CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 484–85 (West 2016) (enumerating the ele-
ments of theft under California state law). 
 148. E.g., Alex Ben Block, MPAA Chief Chris Dodd “Hurt,” Defends His Pi-
racy Strategy, Slams Obama and Google (Q&A), HOLLYWOOD REPORTER (Jan. 
  
2016] MORAL PSYCHOLOGY OF COPYRIGHT 2467 
 
coin, copyright skeptics often take pains to distinguish in-
fringement from theft in order to avoid the moral opprobrium 
that the former may entail.149 Indeed, one district court ordered 
the plaintiffs in a copyright infringement suit to avoid using 
the term “thieves” (or “pirates”) at trial because “such derogato-
ry terms would add nothing to the Plaintiffs’ case, but would 
serve to improperly inflame the jury.”150 
As we have explained above, the metaphors speakers use 
to express their moral indignation help to illuminate the moral 
foundations that animate their intuitive reaction that some-
thing is wrong. The moral meaning of the theft metaphor is 
multivalent, but it can certainly serve as an expression of (or 
an appeal to) the fairness/cheating foundation. A major reason 
that theft metaphors have such power is that they articulate a 
basic violation of the principle of reciprocity: thieves take from 
people without compensating them. Sean Combs, for example, 
connected the idea of infringement-as-theft to the imbalance 
that is generated when one reaps where another has sown151: 
“When you make an illegal copy, you’re stealing from the artist. 
It’s that simple. Every single day we’re out here pouring our 
hearts and souls into making music for everyone to enjoy. What 
if you didn’t get paid for your job? Put yourself in our shoes!”152 
Singer-songwriters also invoked the theft metaphor in a way 
 
19, 2012), http://www.hollywoodreporter.com/thr-esq/chris-dodd-mpaa-piracy 
-obama-google-283289 (quoting the MPAA president as highlighting the moral 
wrongfulness of copyright infringement by saying “[s]tealing is wrong”); see 
also Brief of the Recording Indus. Ass’n of Am. Amicus Curiae Supporting Ap-
pellants at 7, Lenz v. Universal Music Corp., 801 F.3d 1126 (9th Cir. 2015) 
(No. 03-16106), https://www.eff.org/files/2013/10/17/riaaamicusbrief.pdf (la-
menting “widespread theft of intellectual property”).  
 149. Mike Masnick, Why It’s Important Not To Call Copyright Infringement 
Theft, TECHDIRT (Sept. 14, 2010, 8:47 AM), https://www.techdirt.com/articles/ 
20100913/22513210998.shtml. 
 150. Disney Enters., Inc. v. Hotfile Corp., No. 11-204277-CIV (S.D. Fla. 
Sept. 20, 2013) (omnibus order).  
 151. According to the eighteenth-century British decision Millar v. Taylor, 
it is “not agreeable to natural justice, that a person should reap the beneficial 
pecuniary produce of another man’s work.” Patricia Loughlan, Pirates, Para-
sites, Reapers, Sowers, Fruits, Foxes . . . The Metaphors of Intellectual Proper-
ty, 28 SYDNEY L. REV. 211, 220 (2006) (emphasis omitted) (quoting Millar v. 
Taylor (1769) 98 Eng. Rep. 201 (K.B.)). 
 152. What the Artists and Songwriters Have To Say, MUSIC UNITED, 
https://web.archive.org/web/20140406222035/http://www.musicunited.org/3_ 
artists.aspx (last visited Apr. 19, 2016). Examples like this one show how pe-
cuniary and non-pecuniary harms can be mixed. Combs seems to be arguing 
both that he has lost money and that it is unfair for others to take from him 
without contributing anything of their own. 
  
2468 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [100:2433 
 
designed to appeal to the notion of tit-for-tat that is central to 
the cheating/fairness foundation, saying that if you are going to 
infringe copyright, “[y]ou might as well walk into a record 
store, put the CDs in your pocket, and walk out without paying 
for them.”153 
The presence of the fairness/cheating foundation in au-
thors’ responses to infringement extends even beyond invoca-
tions of the theft metaphor. Artists’ frequent expressions of 
moral opposition to unauthorized use of their works sound fre-
quently, perhaps even primarily, in terms of the simple formal 
injustice of people taking from them without providing any rec-
ompense. Author Lloyd Shepherd articulated his sense of in-
fringement’s immorality in terms of his concern that others 
were profiting from his creation (“[s]omebody, somewhere is 
making money from my own labour”), thereby invoking the core 
fairness/cheating idea that it is wrong to reap where others 
have sown.154 And novelist J.K. Rowling’s expression of moral 
approval of the copyright infringement judgment she won 
against the author of The Harry Potter Lexicon in 2008 similar-
ly relied on the law of karma. “The proposed book took an 
enormous amount of my work and added virtually no original 
commentary of its own.”155 What was really wrong was not the 
unauthorized taking itself, Rowling suggested, but rather the 
notion that the author of Lexicon sought to profit from her work 
without providing any commensurate effort of his own.156 Rowl-
 
 153. Who Really Cares About Illegal Downloading?, MUSIC UNITED, http:// 
tech-insider.org/internet/research/acrobat/020926.pdf (last visited Apr. 19, 
2016) (quoting Mark Knopfler of Dire Straits). 
 154. Lloyd Shepherd, Lloyd Shepherd: My Parley with Ebook Pirates, 
GUARDIAN (Mar. 16, 2012, 6:30 EDT), http://www.theguardian.com/books/ 
2012/mar/16/lloyd-shepherd-ebook-pirates-mobilism. 
 155. Shawn Adler, “Harry Potter” Author J.K. Rowling Wins Copyright-
Infringement Lawsuit, MTV NEWS (Sept. 8, 2008), http://www.mtv.com/news/ 
1594367/harry-potter-author-jk-rowling-wins-copyright-infringement-lawsuit. 
 156. It bears noting that not all authors express similar concern for reci-
procity when faced with music infringement. See Artists Give Newsbeat Their 
Views on Music Piracy, BBC NEWSBEAT (Oct. 15, 2013), http://www.bbc.co 
.uk/newsbeat/24524871 (“Before there was the Internet, there was people sell-
ing mix tapes and CDs with your music on it—they sell it, they benefit from it. 
I get promotion out of it, which is a good thing for me, because people like my 
song and put on a stage show.”). 
This is perfectly consistent with—and even illustrative of—the basic prin-
ciples of MFT. The theory indicates that different people tend to favor differ-
ent moral foundations, just as different people think different flavors make 
food taste good or bad. See Ditto & Koleva, supra note 125 (observing that 
people feature different innate moral responses to similar phenomena). So the 
artists who appear unconcerned by unauthorized use may simply not have the 
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ing does not seem to be arguing that the Lexicon harmed her 
motivation to create her novels; instead, she is upset that if an-
yone deserves to make money off of them, it is her and her 
alone. 
3. The Sanctity/Degradation Foundation  
The third moral foundation identified by MFT research is 
sanctity/degradation. Some people’s moral matrix features con-
cern that people, things, or ideas they regard as sacred not be 
treated in a manner they regard as disrespectful or defiling.157 
At first glance, the sanctity/degradation foundation, rooted in 
notions of physical disgust, may seem worlds apart from Amer-
ican copyright, with its antiseptic economic rationale. But con-
cern for sacredness and defilement are commonplace in copy-
right disputes.158 Consider, for example, the extent to which 
judges’ moral disapprobation of copyright cases involving ob-
scene unauthorized uses appears to dictate those cases’ out-
comes. In MCA, Inc. v. Wilson, for example, the Second Circuit 
considered whether the defendant’s obscene parody (“The Cun-
nilingus Champion of Company C”) infringed the copyright of a 
classic American ballad (“Boogie Woogie Bugle Boy of Company 
B”).159 The court denied the defendant’s fair use defense in an 
opinion that seemed driven primarily by moral revulsion at the 
parody’s debasement of a beloved musical standard.160 Numer-
ous other federal courts have denied fair use defenses and 
found copyright infringement where the defendant’s unauthor-
ized use is obscene and the plaintiff’s work is a wholesome and 
mainstream one, such as a Disney character161 or the Dallas 
Cowboys logo.162  
 
same concern for fairness and cheating as those artists who object to the prac-
tice more strongly. 
 157. See HAIDT, supra note 121, at 170–77 (discussing the sancti-
ty/degradation foundation generally). 
 158. See Christopher Buccafusco, Paul J. Heald & Wen Bu, Testing 
Tarnishment in Trademark and Copyright Law: The Effect of Pornographic 
Versions of Protected Marks and Works, 91 WASH. L REV. (forthcoming 2016) 
(manuscript at 1–2, 6–10) (noting that concerns about inappropriate uses of 
copyrighted works figure in owner’s objections to fair use claims and their ar-
guments in favor of extending copyright term extension). 
 159. 677 F.2d 180 (2d Cir. 1981). 
 160. Id. at 185 (“[A] commercial composer can[not] plagiarize a competitor’s 
copyrighted song, substitute dirty lyrics of his own, perform it for commercial 
gain, and then escape liability by calling the end result a parody or satire on 
the mores of society.”). 
 161. Walt Disney Prods. v. Air Pirates, 581 F.2d 751, 752–54 (9th Cir. 
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Respect for sanctity and concern about degradation also 
animate authors’ and owners’ objections to unauthorized use. 
Content industry representatives, for example, often attempt to 
connect copyright infringement with sexual impurity—and in 
particular, pedophilia—in order to generate moral indigna-
tion.163 Authors, as well, express their moral opposition to in-
fringement in terms of sexual violation, with one plaintiff refer-
ring to her work being copied as the equivalent of “literary 
rape.”164 The sanctity/degradation foundation likely also ac-
counts for the moral outrage of devoutly religious sculptor 
Frederick Hart, who sued Warner Brothers for using a version 
of his work Ex Nihilo in an orgy scene of the movie Devil’s Ad-
vocate.165 Hart framed the motivation for his lawsuit not in 
terms of lost royalties or even loss of authorial control, but ra-
ther because he was “deeply disturbed that 13 years of work to 
create a sculpture of the profound mystery and beauty of God’s 
creation would be so debased and perversely distorted.”166  
And even those who are not religious may have their sanc-
tity/degradation foundation activated by infringement. Describ-
ing his legal battles to prevent the use of James Joyce’s work by 
scholars, Stephen Joyce, the author’s grandson, proclaimed, “I 
am not only protecting and preserving the purity of my grand-
father’s work but also what remains of the much abused priva-
cy of the Joyce family.”167 Many musicians have objected to legal 
 
1978); Walt Disney Prods. v. Mature Pictures Corp., 389 F. Supp. 1397, 1398 
(S.D.N.Y. 1975). 
 162. Dall. Cowboys Cheerleaders, Inc. v. Pussycat Cinema, Ltd., 604 F.2d 
200, 205–06 (2d Cir. 1979). 
 163. E.g., Kurt Nimmo, Edgar Bronfman’s Declaration of War Against the 
Internet, NIMMO.FREESERVERS.COM (May 27, 2000), http://www.nimmo 
.freeservers.com/bronfman.html (quoting Bronfman as saying that he will 
“[track] down those who ignore right from wrong . . . hackers and spies, pirates 
and pedophiles”). 
 164. Starobin v. King, 137 F. Supp. 2d 93, 96 (N.D.N.Y. 2001) (quoting au-
thor Christina Starobin). Author Lewis Perdue, who accused Dan Brown of 
infringing his work, said of Brown’s conduct that “I felt violated, like somebody 
had broken into my head.” Author Brown “Did Not Plagiarise,” BBC NEWS 
(Aug. 6, 2005, 10:20 GMT), http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/entertainment/4126710 
.stm. 
 165. See Niebuhr, supra note 11. 
 166. Id. The data reported by Buccafusco, Heald & Bu, supra note 158, 
suggest that inappropriate uses of works has little negative effect on the value 
that consumers attach to the works and that such uses may even enhance con-
sumer value. 
 167. D.T. Max, The Injustice Collector: Is James Joyce’s Grandson Sup-
pressing Scholarship?, NEW YORKER (June 19, 2006), http://www.newyorker 
.com/magazine/2006/06/19/the-injustice-collector. 
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uses168 of their songs by politicians with whom they disagreed 
on the grounds that such a use “perverted” or “tarnished” the 
song or the artist.169 In addition, numerous rock, gothic, and 
heavy metal bands like Rage Against the Machine and Skinny 
Puppy (whom one might not initially assume to be hypersensi-
tive to sanctity/degradation concerns) have sued the U.S. gov-
ernment for playing their musical works without permission as 
part of the interrogation of detainees at Guantanamo Bay.170 
The bands’ actual objections sound less in terms of concern for 
unpaid royalties, and more in terms of their sense that their 
music has been soiled by connection with “torture.”171 Indeed, 
Skinny Puppy sought $666,000 in damages to symbolize “the 
evilness of the [U.S. government’s] deed.”172 Sanctity concerns 
also drive moral considerations about creativity outside the 
context of formal copyright law. Tattoo artists have explained 
their deference to their community’s informal norm that origi-
nal designs not be copied without permission in terms of the 
“sacredness” of such designs that would be violated by unau-
thorized copying.173 
 
 
 168. Many of these uses are legal even though the songwriters have not 
given permission because the venue playing the song has licensed the copy-
rights from the music publisher and owner of the sound recording. 
 169. The Foo Fighters objected to John McCain’s use of their song “My He-
ro,” claiming, “[t]o have it appropriated without our knowledge and used in a 
manner that perverts the original sentiment of the lyric just tarnishes the 
song.” Nick Neyland, Foo Fighters Slam John McCain for Unauthorized Use of 
“My Hero,” PREFIX (Oct. 8, 2008, 11:42 AM), http://www.prefixmag.com/news/ 
foo-fighters-slam-john-mccain-for-unauthorized-use/22200.  
 170. See John Tehranian, Guantanamo’s Greatest Hits: The Semiotics of 
Sound and the Protection of Performer Rights Under the Lanham Act, 16 
VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 11, 18–43 (2013). 
 171. Rage Against the Machine explained, “[a]s artists and as human be-
ings, it sickens us to know that the U.S. government has been using our music 
to torment detainees. We are especially appalled by the discovery that there is 
very little that we, as artists, can do to stop the military and the CIA from 
turning our music into a weapon.” Tom Morello et al., Band Irate at the Use of 
Music for Torture, DENVER POST, Aug. 24, 2008, at 1D. 
 172. “They Are Using Our Music To Inflict Damage”: Canadian Techno 
Band Skinny Puppy Sue US for Using Their Music in Torture of Guantanamo 
Prisoners, DAILY MAIL (Feb. 8, 2014), http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article 
-2554625/They-using-music-inflict-damage-Canadian-techno-band-Skinny 
-Puppy-sue-US-using-music-torture-Guantanamo-prisoners.html. 
 173. Aaron Perzanowski, Tattoos & IP Norms, 98 MINN. L. REV. 511, 555 
(2013). 
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4. The Loyalty/Betrayal Foundation 
Another driver of moral intuition is a sense of whether 
conduct represents loyalty to or betrayal of a relevant in-group. 
Some public issues that are strongly associated with in-group 
symbols, such as flag burning, appear clearly to engage the loy-
alty/betrayal foundation. Initially, infringement may not seem 
to raise any such concerns, at least insofar as it is usually cast 
merely as an economic wrong that complicates copyright’s aim 
of maximizing creative production. Upon closer examination, 
though, copyright’s nexus with this moral foundation emerges 
in unexpected ways. Content industry lobbyists, for example, 
have invoked appeals designed to trigger the loyalty/betrayal 
foundation in seeking more expansive copyright laws. Jack 
Valenti’s 1982 congressional testimony about the VCR is most 
(in)famous for his “Boston Strangler” comment, but Valenti 
even more prominently pointed out that the Sony-made VCR 
was a Japanese product. This enabled a classic in-group narra-
tive of the private home recording issue, allowing Valenti to 
portray the VCR as a “flank assault” on the uniquely American 
domestic film industry: 
The U.S. film [industry] . . . . is the single one American-made product 
that the Japanese, skilled beyond all comparison in their conquest of 
world trade, are unable to duplicate or to displace or to compete with 
or to clone. . . . It is a piece of sardonic irony that . . . while the Japa-
nese are unable to duplicate the American films by a flank assault, 
they can destroy it by this video cassette recorder.174 
Valenti’s attempt to inflame in-group passions, and there-
by access the loyalty/betrayal foundation, could not have been 
clearer. The VCR was a tool of the tricky and aggressive Japa-
nese who were seeking to undermine the U.S. film industry and 
the American economy. Advocating home recording, as Valenti 
framed it, was an act of unpatriotic betrayal. And this is far 
from the only time that pro-copyright lobbyists have appealed 
to in-group loyalty against outsider threats. Supporters of the 
Stop Online Piracy Act (SOPA) and the Protect IP Act (PIPA) 
defended them by invoking the danger posed to domestic crea-
 
 174. Hearings on Home Recording, supra note 138, at 4–5. This is only part 
of Valenti’s rhetoric about the “Japanese threat” posed by the VCR. He 
stressed that “100 percent of these machines are made in Japan and 85 per-
cent of all of the blank tapes are made in Japan,” warned of the “$5.3 billion 
trade deficit with Japan on electronic equipment,” and even referred to Sony’s 
American-born representative, Mr. Ferris, as “[o]ne of the Japanese lobbyists.” 
Id. at 6, 8. 
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tive industries from dangerous “rogue foreign sites.”175 And the 
U.S. Trade Representative’s Notorious Market reports highlight 
infringement by listing foreign websites and physical markets 
that purportedly threaten U.S. copyright interests.176 These 
concerns may be valid, but the reports’ focus on dangerous for-
eign sites to the exclusion of domestic ones resonates with the 
loyalty/betrayal moral foundation by casting them as outsider 
threats to our shared national in-group.177 
Perhaps even more than the “theft” metaphor, the meta-
phor of copyright infringement as “piracy” is often used by cop-
yright owners to portray unauthorized use as morally wrong-
ful.178 Although “piracy” shares some of the same connotations 
as “theft,” it also imports a sense of “foreignness” to those en-
gaged in it. Whether the metaphor calls to mind swarthy, (ho-
mo)sexualized Barbary Coast villains or modern gun-toting 
Somalis, it triggers an intuition that “we” are being attacked by 
a band of lawless, violent outsiders.179 Piracy metaphors arose 
early in copyright debates and in ways that signaled foreign-
ness and disloyalty.180 In the nineteenth century, publishers 
and authors compared America’s unwillingness to protect the 
copyrights of international authors to Barbary Coast pirates’ 
refusal to abide by the law.181 And similar echoes continued 
throughout the twentieth century. In a 1995 address to a House 
committee, Jack Valenti declared,  
 
 175. Block, supra note 148 (quoting MPAA President and former U.S. Sen-
ator Chris Dodd).  
 176. See, e.g., OFFICE OF U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, OUT OF CYCLE RE-
VIEW OF NOTORIOUS MARKETS (Dec. 20, 2011), https://ustr.gov/sites/default/ 
files/uploads/gsp/speeches/reports/2011/Notorious%20Markets%20List% 
20FINAL.pdf. 
 177. Many of the purportedly “notorious” sites are actually quite pedestri-
an. The Report lists the Russian site VKontakte as permitting “users to pro-
vide access to allegedly infringing materials,” id., but the same could easily be 
said of many mainstream domestic sites such as YouTube. 
 178. See generally ADRIAN JOHNS, PIRACY: THE INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 
WARS FROM GUTENBERG TO GATES (2009) (tracing the elaborate history of the 
concepts of piracy and intellectual property). 
 179. See Loughlan, supra note 151, at 219–20. 
 180. JOHNS, supra note 178, at 1–15. 
 181. The publisher Henry Hold argued to the U.S. Senate, “[i]t is time that 
the United States should cease to be the Barbary Coast of literature, and that 
the people of the United States should cease to be the buccaneers of books.” S. 
REP. NO. 50-622, at 2 (1888), quoted in Catherine Seville, Nineteenth-Century 
Anglo-US Copyright Relations: The Language of Piracy Versus the Moral High 
Ground, in COPYRIGHT AND PIRACY: AN INTERDISCIPLINARY CRITIQUE 19, 41 
(Lionel Bently et al. eds., 2010). 
  
2474 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [100:2433 
 
[e]ach year pirates and thieves the world over try to plunder the 
greenhouse of intellectual property. And each year those of us in the 
creative community spend millions of dollars to stand guard against 
this thievery, to punish violators, to move swiftly against those who 
are responsible, to make it risky and expensive for pirates to ply their 
trade.182 
Increasingly, at the turn of the twentieth century, fears about 
piracy often explicitly mention the threat from China, Russia, 
and the rest of the developing world to American prosperity.183 
Marybeth Peters, the former Register of Copyrights, explicitly 
distinguished the relatively banal piracy in the U.S. from the 
especially pernicious international piracy coming from China 
and Russia: 
To be sure, piracy anywhere is serious and cause for concern. . . . But 
all too often, what we see abroad bears no resemblance to college stu-
dents downloading their favorite songs and movies.  
  Much of the foreign piracy about which we are speaking today is 
done by for-profit, criminal syndicates. Factories throughout China, 
Southeast Asia, Russia, and elsewhere are churning out millions of 
copies of copyrighted works, sometimes before they are even released 
by the rights holders. These operations are almost certainly involved 
in other criminal activities. Several industry reports in recent years 
suggest that dueling pirate operations have carried out mob-style 
“hits” against their criminal competitors. And, although the infor-
mation is sketchy at best, there have been a series of rumored ties be-
tween pirating operations and terrorist organizations.184 
Piracy abroad is figured as more dangerous than domestic 
piracy, in part due to its unwillingness to respect American 
values regarding individual rights.185  
Patriotism may be the most common way that the loyal-
ty/betrayal moral foundation arises in the copyright setting, 
but it is far from the only one. Authors may interpret unauthor-
ized copying as an in-group violation insofar as it represents a 
betrayal of another artist. Installation artist Colette Maison 
 
 182. NII Copyright Protection Act of 1995: Hearings on H.R. 2441 Before 
the Subcomm. on Courts & Intellectual Prop., 104th Cong. 23 (1996), https:// 
archive.org/details/niicopyrightprot02unit (statement of Jack Valenti, Presi-
dent and CEO, Motion Picture Association of America, Inc.). 
 183. According to Tom Doctoroff, “China is the total flip-side of the U.S. Pi-
racy goes back to the China world view that individual rights don’t matter.” 
Kenneth Rapoza, In China, Why Piracy Is Here To Stay, FORBES (July 22, 
2012, 9:47 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/kenrapoza/2012/07/22/in-china 
-why-piracy-is-here-to-stay. 
 184. Piracy of Intellectual Property: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Intel-
lectual Prop. of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. 85–86 (2005) 
(statement of Marybeth Peters, Register of Copyrights). 
 185. See Rapoza, supra note 183. 
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Lumiere, for instance, claimed that Lady Gaga had copied her 
installation designs without permission to make Gaga’s 2011 
holiday window displays at Barney’s. Maison Lumiere cast Ga-
ga’s unauthorized use as a betrayal of art-world norms and also 
suggested that the art world itself had betrayed her by not 
supporting her infringement allegations.186  
Beyond the context of formal copyright law, members of 
groups that deploy informal IP norms couch their moral opposi-
tion to violation of those norms in terms of loyalty and betrayal. 
Roller derby skaters, for example, tend to follow strict, central-
ized rules to assure the uniqueness of the pseudonyms under 
which they compete. Complying with these rules when first 
choosing a name represents an act of loyalty, insofar as it rep-
resents deference to an established group norm.187 And skaters 
regard the breaching of these norms as wrong for many rea-
sons, but among them is the notion that not following those 
rules is a betrayal of the close-knit in-group that is the roller 
derby world itself.188 Along similar lines, influential writing 
teacher Gordon Lish sued Harper’s Magazine for copyright in-
fringement when it published the syllabus he had given to his 
students under a condition of confidentiality. Though Lish ex-
perienced no monetary harm from the publication of the sylla-
bus, he was apparently motivated to litigate over a sense of be-
smirched loyalty, having admonished students that “to violate 
the confidentiality of the class is to dishonor yourself irrepara-
bly.”189 
5. The Authority/Subversion Foundation 
The fifth moral foundation reflects the extent to which our 
sense of right and wrong is animated by concern for social order 
and deference to legitimate authority. Two different phenome-
 
 186. See Jenni Avins, Artist Feels Ripped Off by Lady Gaga’s Windows at 
Barney’s, N.Y MAG. (Jan. 4, 2012), http://nymag.com/thecut/2012/01/artist 
-feels-ripped-off-by-lady-gaga.html (including a video of Maison Lumiere in 
which she complains of betrayal both by Gaga as a fellow artist, and by the art 
world for not coming to the aid of one of its own). 
 187. See David Fagundes, Talk Derby to Me: Intellectual Property Norms 
Governing Roller Derby Pseudonyms, 90 TEX. L. REV. 1093, 1128 (showing that 
beginner skaters comply with roller derby’s name-uniqueness rules partly to 
indicate that they are good cooperators). 
 188. See id. at 1111 & n.86 (noting that name copying is wrong because it 
violates the derby world’s “don’t be a douchebag rule” by putting an individu-
al’s selfish desires above the good of the community as a whole). 
 189. Lish v. Harper’s Magazine Found., 807 F. Supp. 1090, 1094 (S.D.N.Y. 
1992). 
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na may trigger this foundation. The first group consists of “any-
thing that is construed as an act of obedience, disobedience, re-
spect, disrespect, submission, or rebellion, with regard to au-
thorities perceived to be legitimate.”190 The second kind of 
behavior that may trigger this foundation is conduct that seems 
to subvert the traditions, institutions, or values that create 
stable social order.191 The extent to which authority/subversion 
drives the moral instincts of players in copyright controversies 
emerges most clearly in the metaphors they use to critique un-
authorized use. The leading metaphor exposing concern for 
subversion of stabilizing social order is theft. One valence of the 
moral attraction of invoking these metaphors for unauthorized 
copying is that they trigger the fairness/cheating moral founda-
tion, as discussed above. But the efficacy of the theft metaphor 
as a moral appeal also lies in its resonance with concern for re-
specting authority. The notion that theft is wrong is ancient, 
and certainly much more widely shared and deeply felt than 
the relatively recent and substantively complex notion that 
copyright infringement is illegal. To equate unauthorized copy-
ing with theft, then, raises concern that more than just a for-
mal legal violation has occurred. Rather, it suggests that the 
infringing conduct threatens the stability of the social order it-
self by eroding respect for long-accepted boundaries of private 
physical space.  
In a speech by Jack Valenti on the subject, aptly titled 
Don’t Be a Scene Stealer, he capped a long moral equation of in-
fringement and theft by warning that the impact of tolerating 
theft was decay of the social order. “Everything we do must be 
rooted in some kind of a code,” warned Valenti, “[o]therwise we 
are anarchists.”192 But the clearest invocation of the authori-
ty/subversion foundation in the context of the theft metaphor is 
courts’ (and other sources’) reference to the Biblical proscrip-
tion “thou shalt not steal” to admonish infringers.193 This refer-
 
 190. HAIDT, supra note 121, at 144. 
 191. Id. 
 192. Jack Valenti, Speech: “Don’t Be a Scene Stealer,” 11 COMMLAW CON-
SPECTUS 307, 310 (2003). 
 193. Grand Upright Music, Ltd. v. Warner Bros. Records, 780 F. Supp. 182, 
183 (S.D.N.Y. 1991) (“‘Thou shalt not steal’ has been an admonition followed 
since the dawn of civilization. Unfortunately, in the modern world of business 
this admonition is not always followed. Indeed, the defendants in this action 
for copyright infringement would have this court believe that stealing is ram-
pant in the music business and, for that reason, their conduct here should be 
excused. The conduct of the defendants herein, however, violates not only the 
Seventh Commandment, but also the copyright laws of this country.”). 
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ence to the Old Testament frames a technical violation of the 
U.S. Code into both an affront to God Himself and a threat to 
social order reflected in a longstanding consensus that we 
should respect one another’s property. 
Similarly, the infringement as “piracy” metaphor likely 
triggers the authority/subversion foundation in addition to the 
loyalty foundation discussed above. The moral power of the pi-
racy metaphor derives from its suggestion of social disruption, 
lawlessness, and moral subversion. Pirates symbolize the ulti-
mate threat to the social order—they follow no nation’s law, re-
spect no central authority, and create a constant threat to both 
commerce and tourism at sea.194 Equating unauthorized copy-
ing with piracy, then, resonates strongly along the authori-
ty/subversion foundation. The piracy metaphor can either ex-
press a speaker’s concern that infringers represent threats to 
established social order and/or trigger moral outrage in listen-
ers who have strong concern that sources of such order be re-
spected. Content industries in particular deploy the piracy 
metaphor to describe the destabilization of the regnant hierar-
chy that gives them a leading role in the delivery of creative 
content, warning that such a breakdown of order will in turn 
redound to the detriment of consumers located lower down this 
hierarchy.195 
A less common, but still telling, metaphor that exposes the 
frequency with which unauthorized copying resonates along the 
authority/subversion foundation is the parent/child metaphor. 
The salience of parenthood as a source of stability and legiti-
mate authority is obvious, and for that reason it shows up as a 
 
 194. This was certainly true as a historical matter. See generally MARCUS 
REDIKER, VILLAINS OF ALL NATIONS: ATLANTIC PIRATES IN THE GOLDEN AGE 
(2004). It remains true today, especially as a resurgence of Somali piracy 
threatens trade and tourism off the Gulf of Aden. See Adam Nagourney & Jef-
frey Gettleman, Pirates Brutally End Yachting Dream, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 22, 
2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/02/23/world/africa/23pirates.html (de-
scribing a “modern-day piracy epidemic” in the waters off the northeastern 
corner of Africa). 
 195. Piracy Prevention and the Broadcast Flag: Hearing Before the 
Subcomm. on Courts, the Internet, & Intellectual Prop. of the H. Comm on the 
Judiciary, 108th Cong. 5 (2003), http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CHRG 
-108hhrg85490/pdf/CHRG-108hhrg85490.pdf (excerpt of letter from John S. 
Orlando, Senior Vice President of External Relations, National Association of 
Broadcasters) (“The information age has . . . vastly expanded the dangers of 
digital piracy. The Internet allows pirated content to be made instantly avail-
able to millions of people. . . . In light of these perils, content creators have 
made clear they will withhold compelling digital content from over-the-air 
transmission.”). 
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central theme in MFT literature’s discussion of the authori-
ty/subversion foundation.196 This helps make sense of the fre-
quency and longevity with which authors have invoked the 
metaphor that their works are like their children.197 Cartoonist 
Gary Larson observed, “[t]hese cartoons are my ‘children’ of 
sorts, and like a parent, I’m concerned where they go at night 
without telling me. And, seeing them on someone’s website is 
like getting a call at 2:00a.m. that goes, ‘Uh, Dad, you’re not go-
ing to like this much but guess where I am.’”198 Framing the au-
thor/work relationship in terms of the parent/child expresses 
the immorality of unauthorized use by triggering the authori-
ty/subversion foundation. It portrays infringement as a deeply 
destabilizing act that threatens a core locus of social stability—
the nuclear family. If the claim of parental authority establish-
es the author’s unique right to determine how his children are 
“raised”—that is, developed, distributed, and matured199—then 
unauthorized use is the home-wrecker that destroys this fami-
ly. Frankie Sullivan, the guitarist and songwriter for the band 
Survivor, objected to Newt Gingrich’s use of the song “Eye of 
the Tiger” on precisely these grounds: “My motives have noth-
ing to do with politics,” he said. “It’s one of my babies, and I’m 
just exercising the laws of this great country.”200 He continued, 
“[m]y legacy, my life, has been ‘Eye of the Tiger.’”201 
 
*** 
 
Part I identified an unappreciated problem in copyright 
law: It assumes that owners will sue only to redress monetary 
 
 196. See HAIDT, supra note 121, at 144. 
 197. The metaphor of parent/child to represent the author/work relation-
ship goes back at least to the Renaissance in the West. Mark Rose, Copyright 
and Its Metaphors, 50 UCLA L. REV. 1, 5 (2002) (quoting Daniel Defoe saying 
that “[a] Book is . . . the Child of his Inventions, the Brat of his Brain”). 
 198. PATRY, supra note 56, at 69–71 (quoting Larson).  
 199. The title of a recent article by Jane Ginsburg, a proponent of moral 
rights, is telling: Jane C. Ginsburg, Moral Rights in the U.S.: Still in Need of a 
Guardian Ad Litem, 30 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 73 (2012). 
 200. James C. McKinley, Jr., G.O.P. Candidates Are Told, Don’t Use the 
Verses, It’s Not Your Song, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 3, 2012), http://www.nytimes 
.com/2012/02/04/arts/music/romney-and-gingrich-pull-songs-after-complaints 
.html. 
 201. Allison Horton, Former Survivor Member Sues Newt Gingrich for Us-
ing “Eye of the Tiger,” CHI. SUN-TIMES (Jan. 30, 2012), http://web.archive.org/ 
web/20140415154014/http://www.suntimes.com/news/nation/10332797-418/ 
former-survivor-member-sues-newt-gingrich-for-using-eye-of-tiger.html. 
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losses, but owners actually sue for a variety of reasons, includ-
ing under circumstances that appear unrelated to that concern. 
Some literature has acknowledged the social problems generat-
ed by this mismatch, but no writing has yet sought to provide a 
systematic map of the moral intuitions that infringement trig-
gers in owners. Part II did just this, analyzing copyright as a 
moral-psychological phenomenon. In particular, it used recent 
research in moral foundations theory to illuminate the plural 
ethical intuitions triggered by unauthorized use, which include 
familiar concerns about pecuniary harm but also encompass 
motivations as diverse as disgust and betrayed loyalty. This 
map of copyright’s moral domain frames our final inquiry: Hav-
ing understood the plural ethical intuitions caused by in-
fringement, how should we modify copyright law’s remedial 
scheme to take account of these instincts while also staying 
true to the constitutional aspiration to maximize creative pro-
duction? We tackle this problem in Part III. 
III.  TOWARD BEHAVIORAL REALISM IN COPYRIGHT 
INFRINGEMENT   
The previous Part showed that, contrary to the assump-
tions implicit in copyright law, owners seek remedies for in-
fringement not only when they experience harm to their crea-
tive monopolies, but also due to a range of other perceived 
transgressions rooted in notions of purity, fairness, authority, 
and loyalty. Moreover, MFT shows that these plural motiva-
tions are the products of innate moral intuitions. Thus far, 
then, our goal in this Article has been to show the flaws in law’s 
assumptions about owners’ subjective experience of infringe-
ment and to show what the actual map of that moral domain 
looks like. This Part develops two implications of these claims. 
The first reflects on the descriptive implications of our argu-
ment for copyright theory, charting a middle path between cop-
yright scholarship’s dominant poles of consequentialism and 
moral rights. We show that the fuller picture of owners’ moral 
responses to unauthorized use is not inconsistent with, and can 
actually be usefully integrated with, the aim of optimizing crea-
tive production. Second, we suggest ways that this middle ap-
proach might translate into doctrine by outlining several differ-
ent policy levers that copyright law might use to incorporate a 
behaviorally realistic vision of owners’ moral intuitions about 
infringement with the law’s aim of optimizing creative produc-
tion. 
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A. MOTIVATIONS AND MORALITY IN COPYRIGHT INFRINGEMENT  
LITIGATION 
The received wisdom about U.S. copyright law focuses on 
markets and financial incentives. According to this view, “mor-
al” (i.e., non-monetary) concerns have no place in copyright law 
discourse. A competing body of scholarship, however, argues 
that since authors experience unauthorized use as a moral 
transgression, copyright law should protect these integrity and 
dignity interests. Our goal is to chart a middle path that incor-
porates a richer understanding of authors’ motivations into a 
more refined copyright consequentialism. This includes under-
standing how copyright’s infringement doctrines could reflect 
the full set of motivations that people have to create and liti-
gate. 
As we explained in Part I, the standard story about copy-
right law focuses exclusively on providing and protecting mar-
ket-based incentives to create.202 The law assumes that authors 
are motivated to create for financial reasons and that threats to 
their financial returns provide the only reasons for filing in-
fringement lawsuits.203 Copyright doctrines reflect these con-
cerns. According to the standard story, so-called “moral” con-
siderations, which include anything not directed at market 
incentives and substitutionary copying, should play no role in 
copyright law.204 Even worse, the argument runs, were such 
considerations allowed to creep insidiously into copyright, they 
would upset the law’s carefully calibrated consequentialist 
structure.205 
In opposition to the consequentialist camp is a group of 
scholars who view certain unauthorized uses of works as creat-
ing meaningful moral (i.e., non-consequentialist) harms that 
copyright law should prevent and remedy.206 Grounded in the 
 
 202. See supra Part I.A.1. 
 203. See Bohannan & Hovenkamp, supra note 100, at 922 (“[M]arket fail-
ure is the starting point for IP laws, and it is market failure that gives rise to 
the need for legal entitlements.”). 
 204. See PATRY, supra note 56. 
 205. See Adler, supra note 115, at 265 (“This essay seeks to undermine the 
foundations of moral rights scholarship, law, and theory. My argument is that 
moral rights laws endanger art in the name of protecting it.”). 
 206. Jane C. Ginsburg, Have Moral Rights Come of (Digital) Age in the 
United States?, 19 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 9 (2001); Roberta Rosenthal 
Kwall, “Author-Stories”: Narrative’s Implications for Moral Rights and Copy-
right’s Joint Authorship Doctrine, 75 S. CAL. L. REV. 1 (2001); Kwall, supra 
note 60, at 1986; Susan P. Liemer, Understanding Artists’ Moral Rights: A 
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natural rights theories of Locke and Hegel, these scholars con-
ceive of acts of intellectual creation as establishing moral bonds 
between authors and their works.207 When others copy, tarnish, 
or degrade their works, authors suffer legitimate injury entire-
ly separate from any concerns about incentives and access.208 
So, too, do authors suffer when they fail to receive attribution 
for their efforts.209 Scholars in this group support the expansion 
of copyright doctrine to remedy non-consequentialist harms.210 
Our approach differs from both the standard account and 
the moral rights account, and it offers a third option between 
these two poles. We are committed to copyright law’s conse-
quentialist goal of optimizing creative production by balancing 
incentives to create with access to the public and future crea-
tors.211 We differ from the standard account, however, in our 
descriptive understanding of authors’ motivations to create and 
to sue for infringement. Where the standard account looks sole-
ly to pecuniary issues as motivations for infringement lawsuits 
and ignores any unrelated concerns, our view depicts authors 
as subject to more heterogeneous motives—including the kinds 
of issues that animate the moral rights framework. In present-
ing a richer, more realistic portrait of copyright authors, our 
approach can better achieve the law’s goals. 
As Part II showed, copyright authors object to unauthor-
ized use of their works for a wide variety of reasons, often hav-
ing little to do with creative incentives or market-based harms. 
 
Primer, 7 B.U. PUB. INT. L.J. 41, 41–42, 44 (1998).  
 207. See MERGES, supra note 60, at 13 (referring to the first-order princi-
ples of IP law as “(1) Lockean appropriation, (2) Kantian (liberal) individual-
ism, and (3) Rawlsian attention to the distributive effects of property”); see al-
so Justin Hughes, The Philosophy of Intellectual Property, 77 GEO. L.J. 287 
(1988).  
 208. Adler explains: 
Indeed, moral rights advocates sometimes speak of art works as if 
they were living things: “To mistreat the work is to mistreat the art-
ist.” It is as if the work has a magical connection to its maker; hurting 
the piece will hurt the artist as if you were sticking pins in a voodoo 
doll. Because of this emphasis on the artist’s (and indeed, the art’s) 
personhood, moral rights are said to have a “spiritual, non-economic 
and personal nature.” 
Adler, supra note 115, at 269 (internal citations omitted). 
 209. Roberta Rosenthal Kwall, The Attribution Right in the United States: 
Caught in the Crossfire Between Copyright and Section 43(A), 77 WASH. L. 
REV. 985 (2002) (arguing that U.S. copyright law should adopt attribution 
rights because of the moral linkage between an author and her work). 
 210. See id. 
 211. A full-throated defense of this consequentialism is beyond the scope of 
this paper.  
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On our view, however, the existence of these concerns is not, 
prima facie, a reason for the law to respond to them. As in most 
cases, a descriptive “is” does not produce a moral “ought.”212 For 
example, simply because opposition to gay marriage appears to 
be rooted in the moral foundation of purity213 does not mean 
that society should roll back all the advances made on the mar-
riage equality front. By the same token, simply because some or 
even many people intuit that copyright should be concerned 
with authority or purity, for example, does not require that the 
legal system must formally adopt rules that are consistent with 
those intuitions.214 Legal systems do not exist merely to track 
people’s intuitions about appropriate conduct; they also exist to 
mold intuitions and behaviors.215 Even though people exhibit 
non-consequentialist responses to copyright infringement, this 
does not mean that U.S. copyright law should come unmoored 
from its consequentialist foundations.216 
The approach to copyright morality that we have described 
preserves copyright law’s normative base but alters its descrip-
tive superstructure. It does not require U.S. copyright law to 
come unmoored from its central consequentialist aspirations to 
incorporate a more nuanced understanding of people’s moral 
reactions to unauthorized use.217 In order to make laws that op-
timize creative production and promote cooperation and social 
 
 212. DAVID HUME, A TREATISE ON HUMAN NATURE 335 (NuVision Publica-
tions 2007) (1737); Rachel Cohon, Hume’s Moral Philosophy, STANFORD ENCY-
CLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY, http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2010/entries/ 
hume-moral (last updated Aug. 27, 2010).  
 213. See Ditto & Koleva, supra note 125. 
 214. For a valuable discussion of the relationship between variation in 
people’s moral foundations and normative morality, see JOSHUA GREENE, 
MORAL TRIBES: EMOTION, REASON, AND THE GAP BETWEEN US AND THEM 
336–41 (2013). 
 215. Indeed, sometimes law operates on the assumption that people’s moral 
instincts are essentially bad and that the purpose of regulation is to counter 
them. Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457, 
460–62 (1897) (explaining how bad men care little about the moral grounding 
of the law but instead about predictions of which behaviors will lead to pun-
ishment). 
 216. For a discussion of recent literature on the relationship between moral 
intuitions and legal rules, see Mark Kelman, Moral Realism and the Heuris-
tics Debate, 5 J. LEGAL ANALYSIS 339 (2013). 
 217. We do not offer a full-throated defense of U.S. copyright’s consequen-
tialism in this Article. Surprisingly few such defenses actually exist. See 
LANDES & POSNER, supra note 16. Sunder presents a “complex consequential-
ist approach that seeks to expand the purpose of this law beyond incentives 
and efficiency to promoting the broad range of values we hold dear in the 
twenty-first century.” SUNDER, supra note 60, at 15. 
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welfare, copyright systems need to be able to comprehend and 
account for people’s responses to unauthorized use—even when 
those responses are not grounded in concerns about incentives 
and market harm. As we described in Part I, when authors sue 
to prevent uses of their works that are unrelated to protecting 
incentives, they cause substantial harms to public access, cul-
tural exchange, and free speech.218 The analysis in Part II is a 
first step towards systematic understanding and prediction of 
authors’ behavior, and it promises to improve the substantive 
law of copyright itself.  
Here, we offer a behaviorally realistic219 version of copy-
right consequentialism.220 As in the standard story, our ap-
proach adopts the same fundamental balancing framework of 
protecting authors’ motivations to create while preserving ac-
cess to works for the public and future creators. It differs, how-
ever, in both its descriptive account of authors’ motivations and 
its normative response to them. A behaviorally realistic vision 
of copyright law appreciates that creativity emerges from a di-
verse, complex, and sometimes contradictory set of motives, de-
sires, reasons, and emotions.221 Some creators are motivated to 
write songs or computer code primarily as a way to make a liv-
 
 218. See supra Part I.C. 
 219. See Thomas J. Miles & Cass R. Sunstein, The New Legal Realism, 75 
U. CHI. L. REV. 831, 831 (2008) (“We are in the midst of a flowering of large-
scale quantitative studies of facts and outcome, with numerous published re-
sults. The relevant studies have produced a New Legal Realism—an effort to 
understand the sources of judicial decisions on the basis of testable hypotheses 
and large data sets.”); see also Jerry Kang & Mahzarin R. Banaji, Fair 
Measures: A Behavioral Realist Revision of “Affirmative Action,” 94 CALIF. L. 
REV. 1063 (2006); Brian Leiter, Legal Realisms, Old and New, 47 VAL. U. L. 
REV. 949, 954 (2013) (noting that the various legal realisms share a skepticism 
that legal doctrine constrains judicial behavior). 
 220. An impressive body of research employing moral psychology methods 
is emerging for other areas of substantive law. As yet, criminal law leads the 
way. See, e.g., Kenworthey Bilz & Janice Nadler, Law, Psychology & Morality, 
in 50 PSYCHOLOGY OF LEARNING AND MOTIVATION: MORAL JUDGMENT AND 
DECISION MAKING 101 (D. Medin et al. eds., 2009); Donald Braman et al., 
Some Realism About Punishment Naturalism, 77 U. CHI. L. REV. 1531 (2010); 
Dan M. Kahan & Donald Braman, The Self-Defensive Cognition of Self-
Defense, 45 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1 (2008); Paul H. Robinson & John M. Darley, 
Intuitions of Justice: Implications for Criminal Law and Justice Policy, 81 S. 
CAL. L. REV. 1 (2007). Other important research is being done in contract law. 
See, e.g., Zev Eigen, When and Why Individuals Obey Contracts: Experimental 
Evidence of Consent, Compliance, Promise, and Performance, 41 J. LEGAL 
STUD. 67 (2012); Tess Wilkinson-Ryan & Jonathan Baron, Moral Judgment 
and Moral Heuristics in Breach of Contract, 6 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 405 
(2009). 
 221. See Cohen, supra note 71. 
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ing by selling copies for a profit. Other creators produce new 
works even though doing so is obviously a bad financial deci-
sion. Instead, they are motivated by a desire to be heard or to 
belong to a community or simply because they cannot help it.222 
Most creators, of course, are moved by multiple reasons.223 Sim-
ilarly, copyright authors object to unauthorized uses of their 
works for various and multiple reasons. A singer may sue a 
woman for using one of his songs in the background of her silly 
YouTube video because he believes that her failure to license 
the work results in lost revenue that affects his desire to cre-
ate224 and because he thinks that the video violates his authori-
al claim to uses of his work.225 Copyright law can function best 
only when it has a full picture of all of these motives. 
In our view, copyright law should continue to police the 
role of non-incentive-based objections to unauthorized use. In 
fact, we believe that it should police these objections more 
strongly. Nonetheless, to successfully optimize creative produc-
tion, copyright law should connect its doctrinal and remedial 
structures with the richer, more realistic picture of creative in-
centives discussed above.226 When authors object to unauthor-
ized uses of their works that are entirely divorced from their 
reasons for creating them, copyright law should turn them 
away. Ex post anxieties about uses that tarnish or degrade a 
work or that upset the author’s sense of fairness should not be 
remedied by copyright law. In the next section, we discuss vari-
ous policy levers for further accomplishing this goal. 
 
 
 222. See Bitzer et al., supra note 80 (finding that “the fun of programming 
is a major motivational driver” for open source software programmers); 
Lakhani & Wolf, supra note 80 (“We find . . . that enjoyment-based intrinsic 
motivation—namely, how creative a person feels when working on the pro-
ject—is the strongest and most pervasive driver.”). 
 223. SILBEY, supra note 73, at 27–28 (discussing the diversity of motiva-
tions that innovators mention). 
 224. See Lenz v. Universal Music Corp, 572 F. Supp. 2d 1150 (N.D. Cal. 
2008) (deciding whether copyright owner had to consider fair use of Prince’s 
song prior to issuing a DMCA takedown notice for a video depicting children 
dancing to the song). 
 225. Mike Blake, Prince To Sue YouTube, eBay over Music Use, REUTERS 
(Sept. 13, 2007), http://www.reuters.com/article/us-prince-youtube-idUSL1364 
328420070914 (“U.S. pop star Prince plans to sue YouTube and other major 
Web sites for unauthorized use of his music in a bid to ‘reclaim his art on the 
Internet.’”). 
 226. Cf. Fromer, supra note 5, at 1761–64, 1781–88 (drawing a connection 
between monetary and non-monetary concerns of authors by looking to social 
norms and the expressive dimension of law). 
  
2016] MORAL PSYCHOLOGY OF COPYRIGHT 2485 
 
But not all of the objections canvassed in Part II of this Ar-
ticle can be characterized in that way. Although we have fo-
cused on authors’ concerns about uses that are unrelated to 
market-based incentives, market-based incentives are not the 
only ones that should matter to copyright law. If the nature of 
an author’s objection to unauthorized use of her work suggests 
that such a use undermines her desire to create new works, 
this is a harm relevant to her incentives to create—what we 
will call an “incentive-based” or “incentive-relevant” harm.227 
For example, many authors are driven to create in order to re-
ceive public recognition for their efforts.228 They may value 
recognition entirely apart from any financial benefit that it 
conveys.229 Accordingly, if others repeatedly use their works 
without attributing them to their authors (a practice that copy-
right law generally allows), those authors may be less willing to 
create in the future.230 Moreover, aggrieved authors might often 
file suits against uses that are technically copyright infringe-
ment but whose only objectionable aspects flow from failure to 
provide attribution.231 The failure to provide a default attribu-
tion right, although it does not directly affect substitutionary 
copying and market-based harm, may have a negative effect on 
ex ante incentives to create and on downstream access to 
works.232 Copyright law must understand the nature of these 
concerns in order to perfect its incentives-access balance. 
To be clear, just because certain behaviors cause incentive-
relevant harms, copyright does not need to make them illegal. 
Copyright law’s balance is a delicate one, and expanding pro-
tection to cover these behaviors could have an unacceptable 
 
 227. Jeanne Fromer and Mark Lemley have articulated a related, but dis-
tinct, argument that copyright infringement should require both technical 
similarity and market substitution. Jeanne C. Fromer & Mark A. Lemley, The 
Audience in Intellectual Property Infringement, 112 MICH. L. REV. 1251, 1299–
301 (2014) (elaborating on this claim). 
 228. See Catherine L. Fisk, Credit Where It’s Due: The Law and Norms of 
Attribution, 95 GEO. L.J. 49, 76–101 (describing contemporary attribution 
norms in various professions); Fromer, supra note 5, at 1764–71. 
 229. See Sprigman, Buccafusco & Burns, supra note 67, at 1401 (distin-
guishing between different reasons authors might value attribution). 
 230. See Fromer, supra note 5, at 1790–98 (proposing that IP law consider 
using “expressive incentives” like attribution). 
 231. It is possible that a photographer might sue a website that posts her 
photos online without attribution not because the website is costing her licens-
ing fees but only because she believes that the unattributed use is unfair or 
disrespectful of her “parental” relationship with her creations. Id. at 1791. 
 232. See Sprigman, Buccafusco & Burns, supra note 67, at 1427. 
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impact on further creative development and on free speech. 
Just as copyright law does not currently provide a remedy for 
every behavior that impacts creative incentives,233 it need not 
do so under a behaviorally realistic version either. Copyright 
law should, however, make these tradeoffs between incentives 
and access, speech, and downstream creativity explicitly and 
with a full view of authors’ plural motives both to create works 
and to file suit. 
B. POLICY LEVERS FOR PRODUCING BEHAVIORALLY REALISTIC  
COPYRIGHT DOCTRINE 
We have repeatedly emphasized the need for copyright law 
to carefully balance creative incentives with access for down-
stream users and creators, and we have argued that the cur-
rent system’s failure to account for the full range of authors’ 
motivations leads to inefficiencies. Given the novelty of this 
contribution and the challenge of striking such a balance, how-
ever, we do not here offer a silver-bullet solution for solving this 
problem. In copyright law, as in other areas of the law, policy-
makers have a range of substantive and procedural doctrines at 
hand that may produce a desired outcome.234 Each of these doc-
trines, however, may have different and difficult to predict 
costs associated with achieving those results.235 So rather than 
advocating change via a single reform, this Article proposes a 
series of possible strategies to achieve copyright’s consequen-
tialist aims.236  
 
 233. For example, the first sale doctrine limits the copyright owner’s rights 
to control of only the first sale of a copy even though allowing owners to recoup 
investments from downstream sales would further add to their financial in-
centives to create. See 17 U.S.C. § 109(a) (2012) (“Notwithstanding the provi-
sions of section 106(3), the owner of a particular copy or phonorecord lawfully 
made under this title, or any person authorized by such owner, is entitled, 
without the authority of the copyright owner, to sell or otherwise dispose of 
the possession of that copy or phonorecord.”).  
 234. See Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Policy Levers in Patent Law, 89 
VA. L. REV. 1575, 1638 (2003) (discussing ten different policy levers that can 
be used to shape patent law). 
 235. Id. at 1577 (“Technology is anything by uniform, . . . and it displays 
highly diverse characteristics across different sectors.”). 
 236. It is also worth noting the possibility that, as some readers have sug-
gested, this Article’s critique of owners’ incentives to litigate combined with 
the preexisting literature critiquing authors’ incentives to create poses a more 
foundational problem for copyright law than legislative modifications can fix. 
While this is a plausible concern—and something for the drafters of the possi-
bly forthcoming new Copyright Act to keep in mind—we take the moderate 
optimist’s position that the reforms suggested in this Section can at least do no 
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1. Substantive Doctrinal Reform 
Our principal concern about copyright owners’ litigation 
behavior involves those lawsuits that are motivated not by con-
cerns about undermining ex ante creative incentives but rather 
by ex post objections to conduct that owners deem wrongful or 
hurtful.237 Litigation, or the mere threat of it, against these lat-
ter unauthorized uses of copyrighted works is costly to the pub-
lic without generating any valuable incentive effect. In order to 
eliminate such socially costly litigation, copyright doctrine 
might be altered to better police plaintiffs’ motivations for 
bringing suit in two ways. 
a. The Prima Facie Infringement Case  
As a first doctrinal policy lever, Congress could change the 
substantive standard for infringement. For example, the Copy-
right Act could be amended to require that plaintiffs establish 
incentive-relevant harm as part of their prima facie case.238 As 
noted above,239 copyright law does not currently require plain-
tiffs to establish that the defendant’s actions caused them any 
harm, financial or otherwise.240 Rather, it deems any violation 
of plaintiffs’ rights to presumptively cause harm.241 This rule 
differs from most tort and property causes of action.242 For ex-
ample, if Alice negligently strikes Bill with her car, he can only 
successfully sue Alice if he can show that he actually suffered 
some compensable harm.243 In copyright law, however, if the de-
fendant displayed the plaintiff’s painting on a set in its televi-
 
harm, and remain well worth considering. 
 237. See, e.g., Sony Corp. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 432 
(1984); Vincent v. City Colls. of Chi., 485 F.3d 919, 923 (7th Cir. 2007). 
 238. Christina Bohannan and Herbert Hovenkamp have made similar ar-
guments recently. See Bohannan & Hovenkamp, supra note 100, at 985 (“IP 
law should recognize harm only for uses that are likely to interfere with IP 
holders’ ex ante decisions to create or distribute their works . . . .”). 
 239. See supra Part I.B. 
 240. Bohannan, supra note 102. 
 241. Id. at 13–15. 
 242. Libel is an exception where harm is presumed based on the defend-
ant’s conduct. Charles T. McCormick, The Measure of Damages for Defama-
tion, 12 N.C. L. REV. 120, 127 (1934) (“[T]he plaintiff is relieved from the ne-
cessity of producing any proof whatsoever that he has been injured. From the 
fact of the publication of the defamatory matter by the defendant, damage to 
the plaintiff is said to be ‘presumed’ . . . .”). 
 243. See RICHARD A. EPSTEIN & CATHERINE M. SHARKEY, CASES AND MA-
TERIALS ON TORTS 146 (10th ed. 2012) (listing the elements of a negligence 
cause of action). The same is true for trespass to chattels. See RESTATEMENT 
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 218 cmt. e (AM. LAW INST. 1965). 
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sion program without the plaintiff’s permission, the plaintiff 
can meet her prima facie burden without establishing that the 
defendant’s behavior caused her any monetary loss or other 
detriment (and even if the unauthorized use may have actually 
benefited her). If plaintiffs were required to show that they suf-
fered a cognizable incentive-based harm, many of the lawsuits 
and threats of lawsuits that most concern us might disappear.  
By incentive-relevant harm we refer to a demonstrable in-
jury to creative incentives, including the incentives to create, 
distribute, and maintain works of authorship.244 What counts as 
incentive-relevant harm, however, will require further elabora-
tion, and we seek here only to highlight and sketch rough con-
tours of this policy lever. At a minimum, we assume that the 
asserted detriment must affect an interest that was reasonably 
foreseeable to the copyright holder.245 Harms to unforeseeable 
interests obviously do not affect authors’ incentives.246 As noted 
above, however, authors’ creative incentives can be damaged in 
a number of ways.247 Because authors create for a variety of dif-
ferent reasons, unauthorized uses of their works that under-
mine those reasons—whether financial, emotional, or spiritu-
al—can curtail an author’s willingness to make new works or 
distribute existing ones. Traditionally, the harm associated 
with copyright infringement has been characterized solely ac-
cording to market-based losses associated with substitutionary 
copying. But the law could also embrace harms to other non-
financial motivations, as well. For example, a plaintiff could be 
allowed to satisfy the harm element of copyright infringement 
by showing that the defendant’s conduct weakened his desire to 
 
 244. See Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 207 (2003) (noting that Congress 
“rationally credited projections that longer terms would encourage copyright 
holders to invest in the restoration and public distribution of their works”). 
 245. See Shyamkrishna Balganesh, Foreseeability and Copyright Incen-
tives, 122 HARV. L. REV. 1569, 1603 (2009) (proposing a test of “foreseeable 
copying” to limit copyright’s grant of exclusivity to situations where a copier’s 
use was reasonably foreseeable at the time of creation). 
 246. Id. at 1574 (“If the law (in other contexts) readily presumes that ac-
tors can only ever factor foreseeable consequences into their decisionmaking 
process, then logically speaking, copyright law should see little need to give 
creators an entitlement to unforeseeable ones. Copyright thus needs to inter-
nalize the idea that incentives have limits and develop a mechanism by which 
to eliminate unincentivized gains from a creator’s entitlement, especially when 
including them in the entitlement is likely to produce more costs than bene-
fits.”). 
 247. See supra Part I.A. 
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create more works in the future because it tarnished the bond 
that he feels with his art.248 
Creating an expansive account of copyright harm would be 
consistent with a more behaviorally realistic account of human 
motivation, but it might also prove problematic to implement 
for a variety of reasons. Whereas a market-based focus has the 
benefit of resting on relatively demonstrable proof of financial 
loss, proving that other, more emotional or internal motivations 
were harmed may well prove challenging.249 Plaintiffs may not 
be able to produce the necessary evidence, and courts may not 
possess the requisite institutional competence to evaluate these 
claims. And perhaps more concerning still, if it is too difficult to 
prove harm to intrinsic motivation, courts may simply take the 
plaintiff’s word for it, turning a substantive element into a legal 
fiction.250 If so, an effort to constrain litigation might, in fact, 
make it easier and more lucrative by broadening the recognized 
protectable interests. In order to counteract this concern, the 
inclusion of infringement-based harm in the prima facie case 
for copyright infringement could be operationalized in the form 
of a pleading requirement. The Federal Rules of Civil Proce-
dure could be amended to require owners to “state with particu-
larity” the harm they have experienced to their creative incen-
tives in their complaint, just as the FRCP requires of fraud 
plaintiffs.251 While this would by no means solve the problem of 
incentive-irrelevant infringement litigation, it would provide a 
small hurdle and some moral suasion reminding plaintiffs of 
the reasons the infringement action exists in the first place.252 
 
 248. The plaintiff might also be allowed to prove that if he had known that 
the defendant would use his work in such a way, he would have been less in-
clined to produce it in the first place. Bohannan, supra note 102, at 24 (refer-
encing J.K. Rowling’s testimony, in Warner Bros. Entm’t. Inc. v. RDR Books, 
575 F. Supp. 2d 513, 552 (S.D.N.Y. 2008), about the harm of a competing 
work’s potential publication on her own desire to create) (“[T]here are times 
when an author claims that an unauthorized use of her copyrighted work 
hurts her incentives to continue in her own creative endeavors, not because 
the use actually hurts sales of her own work, but because it causes psychic in-
jury that deprives her of the motivation to continue working.”). 
 249. They might also be subject to fabrication. Id. at 25. 
 250. In early common law practice, plaintiffs could only gain access to the 
royal courts if the defendant acted with force and arms against the king’s 
peace. Accordingly, clever plaintiffs simply included these allegations in all 
pleadings, and courts did not question them. See S.F.C. MILSOM, HISTORICAL 
FOUNDATIONS OF THE COMMON LAW 61 (1969). 
 251. See FED. R. CIV. P. 9(b) (“In alleging fraud or mistake, a party must 
state with particularity the circumstances constituting fraud or mistake.”). 
 252. There is some evidence that the heightened pleading requirement for 
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In requiring plaintiffs to establish incentive-relevant harm 
as part of their prima facie cases, copyright law can tailor the 
requirement to best balance the competing interests at stake. 
Since we seek here merely to note the availability of this policy 
lever, we stop short of stating with specificity what the ideal 
scope of such a harm requirement would be.253 Importantly, 
though, the incorporation of a harm element is not necessarily 
at odds with copyright law’s allowance of statutory damages in 
lieu of proof of actual damages.254 As explained above, copyright 
law permits a victorious plaintiff to elect statutory damages in 
part out of a concern that proving actual losses will be diffi-
cult.255 But proving the amount of actual losses is different from 
proving that some loss or harm did occur. Uncertainty regard-
ing the degree to which the defendant’s conduct affected the 
plaintiff does not imply that there must be similar uncertainty 
about whether it was likely to cause an effect or not. According-
ly, adding a harm element does not necessarily entail eliminat-
ing statutory damages.256 
b. Affirmative Defenses 
Another promising doctrinal policy lever operates after, ra-
ther than as part of, the prima facie case for infringement: af-
firmative defenses that absolve defendants of infringement lia-
bility. There is, of course, the fair use defense, which currently 
operates as copyright’s most promising means for cutting down 
on infringement suits motivated by copyright-irrelevant harm. 
Fair use’s fourth factor requires judges to consider “the effect of 
the use opon the potential market for or value of the 
 
fraud deters frivolous lawsuits, at least in some specialized settings. Cf. Va-
lerie Lee Litwin, Pleading Constructive Fraud in Securities Litigation—
Avoiding Dismissal for Failure To Plead Fraud with Particularity, 33 EMORY 
L.J. 517 (1984). 
 253. Some of the necessary information might be available but other data 
might not exist. Relevant data would include the volume and costs of copyright 
litigation, including the amount that it would be affected by changes in the 
substantive law. It would also be valuable to be able to estimate the impact 
the change would have on downstream users and creators who would be free 
from costly litigation. 
 254. 17 U.S.C. § 504(c) (2012) (“[T]he copyright owner may elect, at any 
time before final judgment is rendered, to recover, instead of actual damages 
and profits, an award of statutory damages for all infringements involved in 
the action . . . .”). 
 255. 6 PATRY, supra note 35, § 22:153, at 22-415 to -416 (“Statutory dam-
ages have been believed to be particularly valuable where such relief is diffi-
cult to prove.” (citations omitted)). 
 256. Neither, of course, does it entail retaining them. 
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copyrighted work”257 as part of the overall fair use balancing 
test. Courts have interpreted this factor to invite consideration 
of “market harm,”258 such that where an unauthorized use neg-
atively impacts any market that is “actual, customary, or likely 
to emerge,” that weighs against fair use and in favor of in-
fringement liability.259 And while courts have focused more re-
cently on the transformativeness of unauthorized uses rather 
than their market impact on owners’ works,260 uses that inflict 
even negligible or theoretical harms to the market for the 
plaintiff’s work may still lose on fair use claims, especially at 
early stages of litigation.261 And given the massive statutory 
damages that prevailing plaintiffs in copyright litigation may 
recover, the mere risk of such an adverse outcome, even if un-
likely, may well be enough to deter fair uses.262 
Fair use’s fourth factor thus helps countenance infringe-
ment suits that pose no threat to owners’ creative incentives. 
This tendency is exacerbated by courts’ liberal understanding 
of market harm, which extends even to markets that may theo-
retically exist, so that any plaintiff who can produce a plausible 
argument about market harm stands a good chance of overcom-
ing a fair use defense.263 Courts could address this concern by 
 
 257. 17 U.S.C. § 107(4). 
 258. See Fagundes, supra note 91, at 361–77 (discussing courts’ elision of 
“effect . . . on the market” with “market harm”).  
 259. See, e.g., Am. Geophysical Union v. Texaco Inc., 60 F.3d 913, 930 (2d 
Cir. 1994) (holding that any “impact on potential licensing revenues for tradi-
tional, reasonable, or likely to be developed markets” weighs against a finding 
of fair use). 
 260. See Neil Weinstock Netanel, Making Sense of Fair Use, 15 LEWIS & 
CLARK L. REV. 715 (2011) (citing empirical evidence showing that, since 2005, 
the transformative use first-factor analysis tends to predominate in fair use 
analyses, and that the market harm fourth-factor analysis is becoming rela-
tively less important). 
 261. E.g., Monge v. Maya Publ’ns, Inc., 688 F.3d 1164, 1180–83 (9th Cir. 
2012) (denying fair use defense for unauthorized use of private wedding pho-
tographs that owners had no intention of assigning or licensing); Salinger v. 
Colting, 641 F. Supp. 2d 250, 267–68 (S.D.N.Y. 2009) (denying defendant’s fair 
use defense, despite concluding that the unauthorized use had no adverse ef-
fects on sales of plaintiff’s work and only a theoretical negative impact on pos-
sible licensing opportunities for that work).  
 262. See Gibson, supra note 106 (discussing how even low risks of massive 
statutory damages tends to chill unauthorized uses that are likely fair). More-
over, even where defendants win on their fair use defense, courts still may not 
shift attorneys’ fees to the plaintiff, saddling defendants with massive attor-
neys’ fees and court costs. E.g., Savage v. Council on Am.-Islamic Relations, 
Inc., 87 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1730 (N.D. Cal. July 25, 2008). 
 263. For example, in Monge v. Maya Publications, Inc., the Ninth Circuit 
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changing evidentiary standards for plaintiffs’ arguments that 
they have experienced market harm. Presently, courts are 
highly deferential to owners’ assertions that they have suffered 
financial harm, and they do not sufficiently limit the scope of 
harms to those related to creative incentives.264 Limiting this 
deference would help to limit infringement suits only to those 
that are motivated by appropriate considerations. While it 
makes sense to deny fair use in cases where plaintiffs rely on 
evidence that the defendant’s use has inflicted harm on their 
primary market, e.g., by reducing sales of copies of their work, 
courts could apply a heightened standard where owners’ claims 
invoke more abstract concerns about detriments to future or 
secondary markets. A plaintiff’s well-substantiated assertion 
that the defendant’s unauthorized use competed with a pending 
licensing negotiation would meet such a standard,265 but a 
merely plausible claim about potential harm to future second-
ary markets would not.266  
Modifying the fair use defense bears promise for weeding 
out the kinds of infringement lawsuits that are more likely to 
harm than to further copyright’s goal of optimizing creative 
production. Yet this approach too has its drawbacks. Merely 
reminding judges that the fair use defense is meant to work a 
certain way does not guarantee that they will follow suit. 
Courts have displayed a stubborn tendency to bend the fair use 
defense to their will, regardless of statutory admonitions.267 
And attempting to filter out non-incentive-related suits as part 
of an affirmative defense, rather than as part of the prima facie 
infringement case, may not do as much to aid the cause of de-
 
resoundingly held that the plaintiffs’ market for their copyrighted photos was 
harmed by the defendants’ unauthorized publication of them. 688 F.3d at 
1180–83. While this argument has surface plausibility, it ignores the crucial 
fact that the plaintiffs purchased the copyrights in the photographs in order to 
suppress those images and had no intention of selling them for any price, so 
the market the court found to be harmed was purely imaginary. 
 264. See Bohannan, supra note 114. 
 265. See, e.g., Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 
539, 560–69 (1985).  
 266. Cf. Castle Rock Entm’t, Inc. v. Carol Publ’g Grp., Inc., 150 F.3d 132, 
144–46 (2d Cir. 1998) (finding market harm where a plaintiff merely asserted 
that they could have entered the market for the defendant’s derivative book, 
despite lack of evidentiary support that they actually planned to do so). 
 267. E.g., Barton Beebe, An Empirical Study of U.S. Copyright Fair Use 
Opinions, 1978–2005, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 549, 555 (2008) (discussing that de-
spite section 107’s requirement that courts consider all four factors, factors 
two and three have effectively become formalities with no impact on out-
comes). 
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fendants whose uses are monetarily innocuous. Plaintiffs bear 
the burden of proving the substantive case for any cause of ac-
tion they assert, and copyright infringement is no exception. 
But defendants, of course, bear the burden of proof with respect 
to affirmative defenses.268 And while fair use’s status as an af-
firmative defense is contested, as a practical matter, courts 
have expressed reluctance to resolve this issue at earlier stages 
in litigation.269 Addressing the problem of suits motivated by 
copyright-irrelevant harm at this procedural stage, then, would 
likely require defendants to bear more litigation costs than if it 
were folded into the prima facie case and were more readily re-
solvable via motions to dismiss. 
Market harm is, of course, simply one factor in the fair use 
balancing test, so even a more searching judicial review might 
lead to cases where fair use is denied because the other factors 
predominate.270 A more direct policy lever for combating the 
proliferation of non-incentive-related copyright suits would be 
to create an affirmative defense that focuses exclusively on 
whether an unauthorized use inflicts incentive-based harm. For 
instance, just as the Copyright Act provides a safe harbor for 
innocent infringers,271 it could also include a harmless use de-
fense. Such a provision could state that in the case of infringe-
ment that does not inflict incentive-relevant harm, courts have 
discretion to reduce damages to a nominal amount per act of in-
fringement. This failsafe would obviate the biggest threat in 
the copyright infringement arsenal—statutory damages—and 
would be available in cases only where actual damages (either 
plaintiff’s losses or infringer’s profits) would be zero or negligi-
ble. The possibility of litigating a costly infringement suit, only 
 
 268. 3 PAUL GOLDSTEIN, GOLDSTEIN ON COPYRIGHT § 16.3.2, at 16:21 (3d 
ed. 2005 & Supp. 2016). 
 269. E.g., Katz v. Chevaldina, 900 F. Supp. 2d 1314, 1316 (S.D. Fla. 2012) 
(holding that as a “general rule, . . . fair use defenses are not ripe for determi-
nation before the summary judgment stage”); Browne v. McCain, 612 F. Supp. 
2d 1125, 1130 (C.D. Cal. 2009) (declining to adjudicate a fair use issue pre-
sented in a motion to dismiss, and noting that “courts rarely analyze fair use 
on a 12(b)(6) motion”). 
 270. The cases dealing with unpublished works could provide an example. 
See supra text accompanying note 47. 
 271. 17 U.S.C. § 504(c)(2) (2012) (“In a case where the infringer sustains 
the burden of proving, and the court finds, that such infringer was not aware 
and had no reason to believe that his or her acts constituted an infringement 
of copyright, the court in its discretion may reduce the award of statutory 
damages to a sum of not less than $200.”). 
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to recover such nominal damages, would likely deter most own-
ers who seek only to vindicate non-incentive related interests. 
This approach bears certain advantages over merely recal-
ibrating the fourth fair use factor. The fair use defense requires 
judges to evaluate a variety of considerations of which market 
effects are merely one,272 so that concerns about incentive-
relevant harm may be swamped by transformative use or the 
amount of the work appropriated by the plaintiff. But creating 
a freestanding harmless-use defense would raise the same con-
cerns discussed above with respect to the evidentiary and prac-
tical challenges associated with specifying incentive-based 
harm. And, as with reconfiguring fair use’s fourth factor, fram-
ing the harmless-use inquiry as an affirmative defense would 
tilt matters slightly in favor of plaintiffs, by placing the burden 
of proof on defendants. 
Changes to the prima facie case elements or to affirmative 
defenses could help solve the problem that animates this Arti-
cle—the threat of infringement lawsuits that are motivated by 
copyright-irrelevant harm. These policy levers are, in effect, 
two sides of the same coin and, thus, mutually exclusive. Either 
incentive-relevant harm could enter the picture as a matter of 
the plaintiff’s prima facie case, or it could wait to arrive with 
the defendant’s affirmative defense. Which one is preferable, if 
either is, depends on a variety of issues, including which side 
should bear the burden of proof and whether this issue should 
be litigable at summary judgment.273 We anticipate that chang-
es to the prima facie case elements would have the larger effect 
because proving lack of market harm will be difficult for de-
fendants274 and because waiting until trial to litigate lack of 
harm will exacerbate possible wealth differences between rich-
er plaintiffs and poorer defendants.275 
 
 272. Id. § 106 (stating that “the factors to be considered [in a fair use de-
fense] shall include” all four listed statutory considerations (emphasis added)). 
 273. See supra note 269 and accompanying text. 
 274. Cf. Douglas Walton, Nonfallacious Arguments from Ignorance, 29 AM. 
PHIL. Q. 381, 385 (1992) (discussing the philosophical debate about proving a 
negative). 
 275. It is unclear whether the Goliath suing David trope is accurate in cop-
yright litigation. See Christopher A. Cotropia & James Gibson, Copyright’s 
Topography: An Empirical Study of Copyright Litigation, 92 TEX. L. REV. 
1981, 1992 (2014) (noting the relatively similar distributions of large firms, 
small firms, and individuals on both sides of copyright disputes). 
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2. Copyright Remedies 
In addition to manipulating copyright law’s substantive 
doctrine, Congress might also attempt to adjust the law’s re-
medial options to more efficiently balance creative incentives 
and public access. Here we suggest three possibilities that are 
worth considering. 
First, copyright law could reduce its reliance on property 
rule-based injunctive relief in favor of greater emphasis on lia-
bility rule-based damages that are matched to incentive-
relevant harms.276 The threat of an injunction could prevent so-
cially valuable, but technically infringing, uses of a work from 
ever existing. Normally, we might expect that these sorts of us-
es would simply be licensed by the copyright holder so that eve-
ryone benefits. But because we are discussing situations in 
which the nature of the owner’s objection may be based on con-
cerns about unflattering and undesired uses of the work, licens-
ing will be impossible.277 If these are still not to be treated as 
fair uses (and, thus, free uses) copyright law could eliminate in-
junctive relief and limit the plaintiff’s recovery to a figure con-
sistent with the amount of incentive-based harm.278 In some 
cases, at least, the public will still have access to the infringing 
work and authors will receive some compensation for their 
losses. 
Second, copyright law could tailor its remedies to the na-
ture of the incentive-relevant harm that the author has suf-
fered. In particular, when the nature of the harm comes from 
diminished creative incentives associated with the failure to 
provide attribution to the author, courts could impose injunc-
tive relief mandating that all subsequent copies of a work in-
clude appropriate attribution.279 Ideally, this could occur in lieu 
of both injunctive relief that would prevent any copies of a new 
work from being produced and substantial damages.  
 
 276. For the classic statement of property rules and liability rules, see Gui-
do Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Inal-
ienability: One View of the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1089 (1972). 
 277. See Gordon, supra note 42. 
 278. Although the Supreme Court’s recent holding in eBay Inc. v. 
MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388 (2006), that injunctive relief should not be 
automatic in patent cases was predicted to produce a similar diminution in 
copyright cases, the existing empirical evidence suggests that this has not yet 
happened. See Jiarui Liu, Copyright Injunctions After eBay: An Empirical 
Study, 16 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 215 (2012). 
 279. Courts’ equitable authority is given by 17 U.S.C. § 502(a) (2012). 
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Imagine a situation in which a photographer objects to the 
use of her photo in a book because the book does not attribute 
the photo to her. The photographer did not agree to the repro-
duction of the photo, so the use technically constitutes copy-
right infringement. She does not object to the use of the photo 
in general or to the loss of the licensing revenue, but only be-
cause she feels upset about the lack of attribution. Having her 
works connected with her persona is a major reason why she 
enjoys photography in the first place. Instead of completely en-
joining publication of the book or granting the photographer 
substantial damages that might discourage the publisher from 
continuing to print it (both of which could happen under cur-
rent law), the judge could offer injunctive relief mandating that 
all existing and future copies of the book include adequate at-
tribution.280 
This solution recognizes the roles that attribution and per-
sonal expression play in creative motivation, but it does so in a 
more efficient way than other attempts to legally recognize “ex-
pressive incentives.”281 Rather than provide attribution as part 
of the default complement of legal rights that all copyright au-
thors receive, our proposal tailors the use of attribution to situ-
ations in which attribution likely played a role in motivating 
creativity. Legal rights are expensive to provide and expensive 
to contract over, and attribution is no exception.282 Many au-
thors who would be given attribution rights in a default scheme 
would not necessarily value them or would value them for rea-
sons unrelated to creative incentives.283 Contracting over copy-
righted works would become more expensive, and the initial 
distribution of the rights would likely be sticky.284 With our 
suggestion, however, attribution is only provided when appro-
priate—when it was part of why the author created the work in 
the first place. 
 
 280. It is possible that the parties will negotiate to a similar solution in the 
absence of a formal legal remedy. But the existence of the formal legal remedy 
might be valuable for a couple of reasons. It could give legal support to an op-
tion that the parties would not have considered or valued highly otherwise. 
More importantly, it could buoy the defendant’s bargaining power in a way 
that will increase the likelihood that the book will remain in print and acces-
sible to the public. 
 281. Fromer, supra note 5. 
 282. See Sprigman, Buccafusco & Burns, supra note 67. 
 283. For example, they might value them intrinsically for non-
consequentialist reasons.  
 284. See Sprigman, Buccafusco & Burns, supra note 67. 
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Third, modifying the availability of attorneys’ fees may also 
be a promising policy lever for ameliorating the problem of law-
suits that do not seek to vindicate incentive-relevant harms. 
Statutory damages are typically held out as the major weapon 
owners have to strike back at infringers,285 but attorneys’ fees 
can be even more powerful. The cost of bringing a copyright in-
fringement case to trial averages around $600,000.286 And while 
courts have discretion to award or deny fee awards,287 they typi-
cally issue them as a matter of course to prevailing plaintiffs in 
copyright cases—even when the actual amount recovered is 
relatively small.288 Fees thus pose an unappreciated part of the 
reason that suits unmotivated by incentive-based harm are so 
threatening: even if actual damages are small, and even if a 
court grants only a small statutory damages remedy, the attor-
ney’s fees alone (or even their threat) can be financially crip-
pling. 
Here, along the lines of above suggestions, law could con-
sider linking awards of attorneys’ fees to the presence of incen-
tive-based harm. Awarding fees to prevailing plaintiffs who are 
meaningfully seeking to preserve their financial interests 
makes sense. Owners should not have to bear six-figure costs 
merely to vindicate exclusive rights in their works of author-
ship, and the threat of attorneys’ fees is a powerful deterrent 
against unauthorized use. But where owners are seeking only 
to vindicate some sense of moral injustice, the promise of attor-
neys’ fees may actually undermine copyright’s goal of optimiz-
ing creative production. Users whose conduct inflicts no cost on 
an owner’s copyright incentives may still knuckle under to a 
threat of suit if they may have to bear all the costs of the litiga-
tion should the owner successfully show a technical though 
costless infringement. One simple solution would be to require 
owners to show the presence of an incentive-relevant harm as a 
prerequisite for recovering attorneys’ fees. This would serve as 
 
 285. See generally Pam Samuelson & Tara Wheatland, Statutory Damages 
in Copyright Law: A Remedy in Need of Reform, 51 WM. & MARY L. REV. 439 
(2009). 
 286. See AM. INTELLECTUAL PROP. LAW ASS’N, REPORT OF THE ECONOMIC 
SURVEY 25 (2007). 
 287. 17 U.S.C. § 505 (2012). 
 288. See, e.g., Princeton Univ. Press v. Mich. Document Servs., Inc., 869 F. 
Supp. 521, 523–24 (E.D. Mich. 1994) (awarding plaintiff $326,318.52 in attor-
ney’s fees and costs on a statutory damages award of $30,000); Branch v. 
Ogilvy & Mather, Inc., 772 F. Supp. 1359 (S.D.N.Y. 1991) (awarding plaintiff 
$116,729 in attorney’s fees on a damages award of $10,001). 
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a major caution to owners motivated entirely by moral outrage 
unrelated to their pecuniary incentives. Yet it comes with the 
same caveats that we have noted with the above policy levers. 
Figuring out how to prove incentive-relevant harm raises diffi-
cult evidentiary issues, and risks becoming no more than a 
formality. But putting such a hurdle in the way of recovering 
attorneys’ fees would at least complicate matters for copyright 
owners motivated by concerns unrelated to ex ante creative in-
centives, and it would weed out at least some counterproductive 
infringement litigation. 
3. External Doctrinal Checks 
The foregoing policy levers focused on changing the Copy-
right Act itself in ways designed to minimize the social harm 
arising out of inappropriate litigation. Here, we consider a pair 
of policy levers that look to other sources of law either as limi-
tations on owners’ rights to sue for infringement or as models 
for how to deter owners from filing such suits.  
a. Constitutional Limitations 
One external doctrinal check on infringement suits that 
are not motivated by incentive-relevant harm is the Constitu-
tion itself. Scholars primarily cite two constitutional provisions 
that may provide a check on excessively broad or overzealously 
enforced copyrights. The First Amendment’s speech protections 
are implicated by infringement suits in that every enforcement 
of an owner’s copyright effectively shuts down some act of ex-
pression289—albeit typically an unlawful one. And the Progress 
Clause giving rise to Congress’s ability to create intellectual 
property law limits that legislative power to that which “pro-
mote[s] the progress of science and the useful arts.”290 These 
two provisions each seek to support copyright’s ultimate pur-
pose of optimizing creative production, though in different 
ways. The First Amendment’s checks on overly broad copyright 
make sure that owners’ rights do not undermine the American 
 
 289. See Rebecca Tushnet, Copyright as a Model for Free Speech Law: What 
Copyright Has in Common with Anti-Pornography Laws, Campaign Finance 
Reform, and Telecommunications Regulation, 42 B.C. L. REV. 1, 2 (2000) 
(“When one speaker wishes to use another’s words, or even words that, taken 
as a whole, are ‘substantially similar’ to someone else’s words, the government 
may tell her that she cannot. If she has printed books with those words in 
them, her books may be seized and destroyed by U.S. marshals, or she may be 
enjoined from trying to sell them.”).  
 290. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
  
2016] MORAL PSYCHOLOGY OF COPYRIGHT 2499 
 
principle of freedom of expression, while the Progress Clause 
requires Congress to prioritize the public’s interest in access to 
works of authorship (not owners’ desire to profit from them) 
when it creates intellectual property rights.  
Numerous scholars have argued that these constitutional 
principles should give rise to doctrines constraining copyright 
law, and some courts have applied variants of these theories to 
dismiss infringement claims when raised by defendants in in-
fringement litigation.291 Here, too, constitutional theories could 
help address the social costs of infringement suits generated 
dominantly by owners’ inflamed moral passions. In particular, 
defendants could raise such constitutional claims as affirmative 
defenses, plausibly arguing that infringement litigation not 
motivated by incentive-based harm offends both the First 
Amendment’s Speech Clause and Article I’s Progress Clause for 
different but related reasons. As we have explained, angry 
owners increasingly file suit not because of concern for their 
creative incentives, but because they seek to use copyright as a 
tool of censorship to silence expression that offends their ethi-
cal intuitions.292 In such cases, copyright’s incentive-protecting 
function is negligible, but its capacity to harm speech is at its 
zenith.293 Such cases warrant applying the First Amendment to 
preclude owners from suppressing free expression by pursuing 
such litigation. The use of copyright to strike back at unauthor-
ized uses that owners find immoral—either because it offends 
their religious beliefs or simply because they find the use per-
sonally embarrassing—also lies in clear tension with the Pro-
gress Clause’s twin admonitions that the public, not owners, 
are the primary beneficiaries of copyright law, and that copy-
 
 291. See, e.g., Suntrust Bank v. Houghton Mifflin Co., 268 F.3d 1257, 1259 
(11th Cir. 2001) (holding that First Amendment speech concerns warranted 
skepticism about owner’s copyright infringement suit against defendant’s par-
ody of its work). While the Suntrust court did not explicitly frame its decision 
in terms of the Progress Clause, it did stress that copyright was designed to 
“promote learning,” an aim that was undermined by the plaintiff’s lawsuit. Id. 
at 1261. 
 292. See, e.g., Northland Family Planning Clinic, Inc. v. Ctr. for Bio-Ethical 
Reform, 868 F. Supp. 2d 962 (C.D. Cal. 2012) (describing lawsuit filed by a 
pro-choice group against a pro-life group for its criticism of the former’s vide-
os); Henley v. DeVore, 733 F. Supp. 2d 1144 (C.D. Cal. 2010) (granting sum-
mary judgment on copyright infringement claim for unauthorized use of musi-
cal works owned by left-leaning musician Don Henley in campaign ads for 
Republican Senate candidate Chuck DeVore). 
 293. See Tehranian, supra note 94 (cataloguing the speech-related harms of 
the increasing trend toward using copyright as a tool of political and personal 
censorship). 
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right serve as a means of promoting cultural progress. Of 
course, these constitutional doctrines are typically invoked as 
constraints on legislation. But Congress does not have the pow-
er to pass copyright law that simply protects private owners’ 
ethical sensibilities at the expense of enriching the public. This 
allows legislative constraints to be recast as affirmative defens-
es: Defendants could argue that courts should regard infringe-
ment suits that seek to remedy copyright-irrelevant harm as 
lying outside the constitutionally valid scope of the Copyright 
Act’s remedial provisions.294 If accepted, this would result in the 
judicial recognition of one of the changes to the prima facie case 
or defenses discussed above. 
Using a constitutional affirmative defense as a policy lever 
in this context bears promise. One distinct advantage of this 
approach as compared to doctrinal reform is that it does not re-
quire legislative action, obviating the practical difficulties asso-
ciated with getting a gridlocked Congress to do anything, and 
instead allowing individual litigants to selectively deploy 
Speech or Progress Clause arguments against copyright-
irrelevant lawsuits. That said, this policy lever is also subject to 
a number of limitations, even beyond the concerns raised above 
about articulating a stable notion of incentive-relevant harm. 
Probably the most serious concern is the challenge of translat-
ing constitutional theories into a coherent and enforceable doc-
trine. While many articles have been written about different 
ways that both the First Amendment and the Progress Clause 
could cabin excessive copyright litigation,295 courts have been 
loath to actually apply these theories. The First Amendment 
has only occasionally been invoked to block expression-
suppressive litigation,296 and courts have consistently rejected 
 
 294. Put another way, courts could conclude that those provisions are un-
constitutional as applied to infringement suits that seek remedies for copy-
right-irrelevant harm.  
 295. E.g., Netanel, supra note 113, at 1; David Olson, First Amendment 
Based Copyright Misuse, 52 WM. & MARY L. REV. 537 (2010); Malla Pollack, 
Dealing with Old Father William, or Moving from Constitutional Text to Con-
stitutional Doctrine: Progress Clause Review of the Copyright Term Extension 
Act, 36 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 337 (2002); Ned Snow, The Regressing Progress 
Clause: Rethinking Constitutional Indifference to Harmful Content in Copy-
right, 47 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1 (2013); Tushnet, supra note 289. 
 296. E.g., Golan v. Gonzales, 501 F.3d 1179 (10th Cir. 2007) (invalidating 
removal of works from the public domain under the Uruguay Round Amend-
ments Act on a First Amendment theory), rev’d sub nom. Golan v. Holder, 132 
S. Ct. 873 (2012) (which sort of proves the point); Suntrust Bank, 268 F.3d at 
1259 (reversing and remanding district court’s finding of infringement liability 
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Progress Clause challenges in light of the wide deference owed 
by the judicial branch to Congress’s legislative 
decisionmaking.297 Using this policy lever in infringement law-
suits inspired by copyright-irrelevant harm would require a 
much more liberal approach toward constitutional doctrines 
than courts have previously displayed in this setting. Even a 
handful of victories for defendants on such theories, though, 
could give pause to owners otherwise inclined to file suit for 
copyright-irrelevant harm and provide one more tool for better 
assuring that infringement litigation furthers copyright’s con-
stitutional aspirations. 
b. Statutory Penalties 
Section 512(f) of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act 
(DMCA) provides a promising model for an additional policy 
lever that might ameliorate the problem of infringement suits 
unrelated to incentive-based harm. Wrongfully sued defendants 
could be allowed recourse to damages associated with having to 
defend suits not motivated by incentive-relevant harm. The 
DMCA allocates to copyright owners the ability to issue 
takedown letters to Internet service providers hosting unau-
thorized uses of their works, but it also seeks to balance the 
risk that owners may abuse this prerogative with a provision 
allowing users to sue owners for the damages incurred by bad-
faith takedown notices.298 This provision has been invoked in 
several high-profile cases, such as when Prince issued a 
takedown notice regarding a home video of a baby dancing to 
“Let’s Go Crazy,”299 and when Diebold issued a takedown notice 
regarding leaked internal emails that cast the company in a 
negative light.300 In both of these instances, courts found that 
 
on a First Amendment theory). 
 297. E.g., Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186 (2003) (rejecting a Progress 
Clause challenge to the Copyright Term Extension Act). 
 298. 17 U.S.C. § 512(f) (2012) (“Any person who knowingly materially mis-
represents under this section—(1) that material or activity is infringing, or (2) 
that material or activity was removed or disabled by mistake or misidentifica-
tion, shall be liable for any damages, including costs and attorneys’ fees, in-
curred by the alleged infringer, by any copyright owner or copyright owner’s 
authorized licensee, or by a service provider, who is injured by such misrepre-
sentation, as the result of the service provider relying upon such misrepresen-
tation in removing or disabling access to the material or activity claimed to be 
infringing, or in replacing the removed material or ceasing to disable access to 
it.”).  
 299. Lenz v. Universal Music Corp., 572 F. Supp. 2d 1150 (N.D. Cal. 2008). 
 300. Online Policy Grp. v. Diebold, 337 F. Supp. 2d 1195 (N.D. Cal. 2004). 
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the uses lay so clearly within the fair use defense that the own-
ers’ assertions that they were infringing amounted to misrepre-
sentations and warranted damages under section 512(f). 
As we have explored in detail, infringement suits motivat-
ed by copyright-irrelevant harm similarly exact outsized social 
costs both to users, who are threatened with individual liabil-
ity, and to the public, who may lose access to works that it 
would otherwise be able to consume and enjoy. Copyright law 
could also include such a remedial section, modeled on section 
512(f) of DMCA, that promises to make defendants whole for 
infringement lawsuits in which they prevail, if a court finds 
that the owner’s suit was unrelated to incentive-relevant 
harm.301 This would provide a more robust remedy than the 
Copyright Act currently provides to victorious defendants. Cur-
rent law merely permits courts discretion to award costs and 
attorneys’ fees to prevailing parties (plaintiffs or defendants),302 
and so judges remain free to decline to engage in such cost-
shifting—which they often do.303 A section 512(f)-style option for 
victorious copyright defendants, by contrast, would be manda-
tory and would include all costs inflicted on the defendant by 
the owner’s bogus suit—including, but not limited to, attorneys’ 
fees and court costs.304 This greater scope would allow courts to 
take account of the full measure of social costs incurred by in-
fringement lawsuits unrelated to incentive-based harm, includ-
ing not only the direct litigation costs borne by defendants, but 
also other costs to the defendant—and, depending on statutory 
 
 301. The closest existing such doctrine is the common-law notion of copy-
right misuse, which allows defendants to shield themselves to liability from 
infringement suits that are rooted in owners’ attempts to wrongly expand 
their copyright monopolies. This doctrine has been used with success very 
rarely, though, such as where the owner’s conduct was found to be anticompet-
itive, see Lasercomb Am., Inc. v. Reynolds, 911 F.2d 970, 978 (4th Cir. 1990), 
or to suppress valid literary criticism, see Schloss v. Sweeney, 515 F. Supp. 2d 
1068, 1081 (N.D. Cal. 2007). Yet this doctrine only enables defendants to en-
join the plaintiff’s enforcement of the copyright during the period of misuse; it 
does not permit retrospective compensation of damages flowing from that mis-
use. Schloss, 515 F. Supp. 2d at 1079. 
 302. 17 U.S.C. § 505. 
 303. A court recently declined to order a plaintiff to pay a defendant’s costs 
and fees in a copyright infringement case where the court found that the 
plaintiff’s failed infringement claim was “never strong and litigated anemical-
ly.” Savage v. Council on Am.-Islamic Relations, Inc., No. C 07-06076 SI, 2009 
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4926, at *1–3 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 26, 2009). 
 304. Cf. 17 U.S.C. § 512(f) (stating that parties who issue takedown notices 
based on false infringement claims “shall be liable for any damages . . . in-
curred by the alleged infringer” (emphasis added)).  
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phrasing, even the public305—so that the damage wrought by 
these suits is fully compensated. The threat of such broad lia-
bility for pursuing losing infringement claims unrelated to in-
centive-based harm could be a potent deterrent to owners oth-
erwise inclined to file suit for unauthorized use rooted solely in 
such concerns.306 
Some of the downsides of this policy lever have already 
been indicated in other contexts. To the extent that parsing “in-
centive-relevant harm” creates interpretive challenges for judg-
es, that problem would apply with similar force here. It is also 
worth noting that while several high-profile cases have illus-
trated the promise of DMCA section 512(f), such cases are rela-
tively few, leading some scholars to express concern that de-
fendants lack the time, resources, and risk tolerance to seek the 
remedies this section makes available.307 Such objections would 
similarly apply in the context of our hypothetical remedial 
cause of action for copyright defendants, who also tend to be 
impecunious and risk-averse. One way to ameliorate this latter 
concern would be to make recovery of such damages available 
on a qui tam basis, so that members of the public could act as 
private attorneys general, recovering the statutory penalties—
on behalf of both wrongly accused infringement defendants and 
the public more generally—made available by a copyright ana-
logue of DMCA section 512(f).308 
 
 305. Accounting for the broadly distributed access-related costs inflicted on 
the public by overzealous infringement suits would be a challenging endeavor 
indeed. One possibility for avoiding this valuation morass would be to include 
a flat-fee damages amount accounting for public costs as an automatic part of 
defendants’ recoveries. 
 306. See Lydia Pallas Loren, Deterring Abuse of the Copyright Takedown 
Regime by Taking Misrepresentation Claims Seriously, 46 WAKE FOREST L. 
REV. 745, 746 (2011) (“If appropriately interpreted, the [DMCA section 512(f)] 
misrepresentation claim holds great promise for protecting both copyright 
owners and lawful users of copyrighted works.”). 
 307. Id. at 751 (noting these concerns and adding that courts’ restrictive 
interpretations of DMCA section 512(f) have further limited its availability).  
 308. Such actions are most familiar in the context of the federal False 
Claims Act, 31 U.S.C. §§ 3729–33 (2012), which allows private citizens to 
bring suit against government contractors for violations of federal regulations. 
The rationale for qui tam actions in the FCA setting is actually quite analo-
gous to the rationale for developing a remedial cause of action for overreaching 
copyright infringement suits. FCA qui tam actions are premised on the notion 
that fraud in government contracting ultimately harms not just state entities, 
but also the public. Similarly, here, seeking remedies against owners who 
overextend their copyright monopolies helps not only defendants who suffer 
the expense of defending these suits, but also the public, which bears the cost 
of lost access and chilled expression that such lawsuits may engender. 
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4. Administrative Options 
A final policy lever that could be integrated with some or 
all of these doctrinal reforms operates at the administrative 
level. Copyright’s administrative body is the Copyright Office,309 
which occasionally issues clarifying regulations and circulars 
but primarily engages in the ministerial task of processing reg-
istrations and recordations of works of authorship. Some schol-
ars have suggested that the Office could take a more active role 
in administering copyright law, such as by adjudicating certain 
kinds of infringement disputes as a less costly, more efficient 
alternative to full-scale litigation.310 This administrative strate-
gy holds promise for remedying the concerns raised by this Ar-
ticle as well. In the foregoing discussion of various policy levers, 
a common thread has been the need to identify some notion of 
incentive-relevant harm as a threshold issue for limiting the 
scope of infringement liability by various means. Yet in each of 
these cases, courts would have to resolve this conceptually dif-
ficult issue, raising the kinds of uncertainty concerns that may 
still deter financially harmless use.311 
Consider, then, the possibility of enabling the Copyright 
Office to issue advice letters that opine on whether a given in-
stance of unauthorized use does or does not engage incentive-
based harm. Such letters could issue from adjudicators with 
expertise in copyright litigation and would simply render a pre-
liminary, advisory opinion on that issue based on the parties’ 
limited submissions that would not be dispositive in subse-
quent litigation.312 Receiving an unfavorable letter would not 
preclude an owner’s going forward with an infringement suit, 
 
 309. The Copyright Office is an Article I entity, located within the legisla-
tive branch of the federal government. See 2 U.S.C. § 136 (2012); 17 U.S.C. 
§ 701. 
 310. See, e.g., Michael W. Carroll, Fixing Fair Use, 85 N.C. L. REV. 1087, 
1122–28 (2007) (outlining a proposal to have the Copyright Office create three-
member boards to resolve fair use issues separately from federal litigation); 
Fagundes, supra note 99, at 182–88 (suggesting that the Copyright Office is-
sue advisory letters when asked to opine on specific instances of unauthorized 
or highly similar use). 
 311. See Gibson, supra note 106 (observing that even very low risks of lia-
bility or litigation costs may deter unauthorized users, who are often impecu-
nious compared to copyright owners). 
 312. Indeed, giving an Article I administrative agency authority to deter-
mine the outcome of federal litigation would likely violate the separation of 
powers principle. United States v. Sparks, 687 F. Supp. 1145 (E.D. Mich. 
1988) (holding that exercise of power by one branch that is constitutionally 
allocated to another violates separation of powers). 
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but it would make owners think twice if it forced them to con-
front the possibility that they might recover no or limited rem-
edies after suit. There are a variety of models for how such ad-
vice letters would interact with copyright litigation. Law could 
require owners to seek such letters as a mandatory prerequisite 
to filing infringement suits,313 or it could make them optional 
and available to either party.314 The former option would add a 
hurdle that would be daunting for owners if they received a rul-
ing that the infringement at issue did not entail incentive-
relevant harm. The latter option would prove useful to poten-
tial defendants in cases that involved no such harm, giving 
them a powerful means of deterring suit—especially if a show-
ing of such harm was a prerequisite to recovery of certain rem-
edies or even to the prima facie infringement case itself, as we 
have suggested above. And the practice of issuing advice letters 
would be useful also because it would create a body of advisory 
precedent to which future owners and users could turn in as-
sessing whether the Copyright Office (or courts) is likely to re-
gard their dispute as involving copyright-based harm.  
Adding a layer of administrative procedure to copyright lit-
igation may prove a cheap and efficient way to resolve many 
pending infringement suits that do not involve incentive-
relevant harm, fending off such matters before they reach full-
blown (and much more costly) federal litigation. Administrative 
adjudication would also bring specialized expertise, which may 
ameliorate the difficulties courts would inevitably face when 
specifying the notion of incentive-based harm. That said, the 
objections to such an approach are several, and worth noting. 
Agencies are subject to capture by industry,315 which could lead 
to the issuance of advice letters becoming a formality that inev-
itably favored owners. Owners might also object that even 
purely advisory letters unduly interfere with their right to vin-
dicate infringement matters in federal court, either on due pro-
 
 313. The EEOC uses a similar practice, requiring plaintiffs seeking to file 
discrimination lawsuits against federal employers to engage in mandatory 
mediation, and then receive a “right to sue” letter that entitles them to move 
forward with their lawsuit if the mediation does not resolve it. See 42 U.S.C. 
§ 2000e-5(f)(1) (2012). 
 314. This approach is similar to the SEC’s use of no-action letters, No Ac-
tion Letters, U.S. SECS. & EXCHANGE COMM’N, http://www.sec.gov/answers/ 
noaction.htm (last visited Apr. 19, 2016) (describing this practice), and the IRS 
practice of issuing letter rulings, Rev. Proc. 2007-1, 2007-1 I.R.B. 1 (outlining 
the IRS private letter ruling process). 
 315. For the classic account of regulatory capture, see George J. Stigler, 
The Theory of Economic Regulation, 2 BELL J. ECON. & MGMT. SCI. 3 (1971). 
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cess316 or separation of powers grounds.317 And adding a new 
administrative adjudicative process is not cheap, so that em-
ploying this strategy may force the Copyright Office to further 
ration its notoriously limited resources in ways that would ex-
act other social costs.318 But the strategy we have sketched here 
is but one of a number of possibilities for leveraging the author-
ity and expertise of the Copyright Office in the service of better 
accounting for the moral psychology of infringement.319 
 
*** 
 
This Part has taken on the challenge of incorporating the 
innate moral responses owners exhibit when their works are 
infringed with copyright’s central aspiration of optimizing crea-
tive production. Part of this project is conceptual. Part III.A 
sought to chart a middle path between the two classic copyright 
paradigms of monetary instrumentalism and moral rights. Our 
counterintuitive suggestion is that only by taking account of 
the realities of moral psychology can copyright truly achieve its 
consequentialist ends. But this theory needs to translate into 
practice if our insights are going to have practical bite. To that 
end, we offer the suggestions of Part III.B as policy levers that 
 
 316. Especially in the case of mandatory advice letters, copyright owners 
may argue that the hardships imposed on them by having to advert to admin-
istrative process create an undue burden on their due process prerogative to 
have their ownership interests evaluated by federal courts. See Matthews v. 
Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 332–35 (1976) (discussing the three-part balancing 
test that governs this issue). 
 317. The separation of powers argument would call into question the pro-
priety of having a legislative agency resolve issues that are the constitutional 
province of Article III courts. See Sparks, 687 F. Supp. at 1145. Michael Car-
roll has carefully considered and convincingly dismissed these constitutional 
objections in the context of his proposal to have fair use issues resolved admin-
istratively. See Carroll, supra note 310, at 1133–35. 
 318. It could, for example, make even slower the Office’s processing of cop-
yright registration applications, which has slowed to a crawl due to budget 
cuts. See Lyndsey Layton, © 2009? Wishful Thinking, Perhaps, as Backlog 
Mounts, WASH. POST, May 19, 2009, at A1 (observing backlog of about two 
years for registration applicants). Issuing these letters would not, of course, 
come without a cost to litigants, and it is possible that the fees associated with 
the letters would substantially offset the costs to the Office. 
 319. To take just one other quick example, the Copyright Office could issue 
a circular seeking to define the notion of incentive-relevant harm, much as it 
frequently issues circulars seeking to resolve hard definitional issues arising 
out of the Copyright Act. E.g., U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, CIRCULAR NO. 9, 
WORK MADE FOR HIRE (2012) (defining “work made for hire” in light of statu-
tory definition and court decisions). 
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might make copyright law better adapted to owners’ moral psy-
chology. We present these options not to demonstrate that any 
particular one is clearly right and should be adopted by Con-
gress and the courts, but simply as promising examples of the 
kinds of strategies that are available to address the problem of 
infringement litigation that derives from concerns unrelated to 
harm relevant to copyright incentives. 
  CONCLUSION   
Contrary to copyright law’s standard narrative, authors’ 
motivations are complex. But so too is the effort involved in 
crafting appropriate copyright policy. This Article’s descriptive 
claims about the heterogeneity of owners’ litigation motives 
will be, we hope, widely admitted upon review of the evidence 
we present. And we expect that others will also agree that the 
mismatch between copyright’s standard story and the behav-
iorally realistic portrait that we offer can create a series of 
problems for the law’s attempts to optimize creative production. 
Figuring out which of the series of policy levers we mention will 
best solve those problems is, of course, a much more difficult 
enterprise. 
One thing we suspect all readers will agree with is the 
need for further empirical study in this area. It would be valu-
able to know precisely what sorts of activities trigger owners’ 
moral foundations and how widely distributed those responses 
are. For instance, do most copyright owners object to prurient 
uses of their works, or is this a concern that is mostly felt by a 
subset of them? Moreover, to what extent, if any, does a sense 
of moral outrage over unauthorized use—prurient or other-
wise—affect those authors’ willingness to keep creating new 
works? In addition, we would like to know how malleable these 
moral intuitions are. To what extent are they based on the con-
tours of current social norms or copyright doctrine, and to what 
extent are they more or less hard-wired aspects of how humans 
relate to their creations? 
Answering these and related questions should rank high 
on the list of copyright scholars’ priorities for the coming years. 
With the promise of a new copyright act around the corner,320 
now is the time to flesh out a behaviorally realistic picture of 
copyright authorship and litigation. 
 
 320. See Maria A. Pallante, The Next Great Copyright Act, 36 COLUM. J.L. 
& ARTS 315 (2013) (speech by current U.S. Register of Copyrights on the need 
to review and revise current copyright law).  
